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ABSTRACT  
 
The lawful use of nuclear weapons in self-defence sits in a precarious and fraught position 
amongst lawyers, states and scholars, primarily due to their indiscriminate destructive nature. 
The use of nuclear weapons is the biggest threat to peace and security yet they exist under 
obscurity in International Law. The purpose of this paper is to examine at what point, and 
under what circumstances, a State is lawfully permitted to use nuclear weapons in self-
defence. The right to self-defence is a basic normative right codified in the United Nations 
Charter (UN Charter). The inherent right to self-defence is the primary justification for the 
use of nuclear weapons according to the International Court of Justice in the Advisory 
Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion). Even 
so, nuclear weapons would still have to meet the threshold of self-defence and the cardinal 
principals of ‘imminence’, ‘necessity’ and ‘proportionality’ which regulate the lawfulness of 
a state’s actions in self-defence. Since there has only been two situations where nuclear 
weapons have been used- in Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945- it is necessary to examine 
three hypothetical situations in which nuclear weapons are used in self-defence to determine 
if, under any, exceptional circumstances such action could be lawful.  
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INTRODUCTION  
 
The purpose of this paper is to examine under what circumstances, is a state lawfully 
permitted to use nuclear weapons in self-defence. The development of nuclear weapons and 
their unprecedented catastrophic power has certainly caused uncertainty about the concept of 
self-defence in international law. Chapter 1 will examine how nuclear weapons are governed 
under international law and how they have altered the concept of self-defence. Chapter 2 will 
address the doctrine of self-defence in itself, the threshold of an Armed attack, and pre-
emptive self-defence- a possible exception to the requirement of an armed attack in the 
nuclear era. Chapter 3 will assess the principals of imminence, necessity and proportionality, 
which will involve an examination of customary international law that undeniably govern the 
right to self-defence and will involve the evaluation of state practice and opinion juris. Lastly 
chapter 4 will consider three hypothetical scenarios in which nuclear weapons are used in 
self-defence and attempt to identify in what circumstance if any, can a state be permitted to 
use nuclear weapons. Since the outbreak of the North Korean crisis and their defiance on the 
non-nuclear proliferation regime, nuclear war between the USA and North Korea seems 
inevitable. That is why I use the two states as guinea pigs to assess the legitimate right of 
self-defence. Scenario 1 will involve a nuclear response to a conventional attack, Scenario 2 
will be a nuclear response to a nuclear attack and the last scenario number 3 will examine a 
pre-emptive1 nuclear attack.  
 
 
CHAPTER 1: NUCLEAR WEAPONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HOW 
THEY HAVE ALTERED THE DOCTRINE OF SELF-DEFENCE 
 
I. NUCLEAR WEAPONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW  
Under current international law, the law governing the use of force is evidently subject to 
Article 2(4) which prohibits the use of force unless such force falls under the exception of 
self-defence which is encompassed in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter2 (UN Charter) 
or sanctioned by the Security Council3. The effects of nuclear weapons are considered against 
International Humanitarian Law (IHL) but the court decided in its Nuclear Weapons Advisory 
 
1 A pre-emptive strike is action taken in response to an imminent, already-materialized threat. 
2 United Nations Charter, United Nations (1945). 
3 Security Council authorization of force goes beyond the scope of this paper.  
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Opinion (Advisory Opinion)4 the International Court of Justice (ICJ) decided that the legality 
of nuclear weapons should be judged based on the law of the use of force. There are various 
conventions that restrict or outlaw Weapons of mass destruction (WMD), yet nuclear 
weapons are not unlawful. Nuclear weapons fall under the obligations of the UN Charter and 
ultimately either the security council or Article 51. Although there is no international 
convention that explicitly prohibits all uses of nuclear weapons, the effects of all weapons are 
governed by numerous conventions and customary international law and multilateral 
treaties.5 Significantly, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) helps the 
international community limit the acquisition, manufacture, possession, deployment and 
testing of nuclear weapons. The Nuclear Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is also a key player in 
regulating and promoting cooperation with an end goal of nuclear disarmament. However, 
the most notable analysis of the international law concerning nuclear weapons comes from 
the ICJ’s Advisory Opinion in 1996, which was written at the request of the General 
Assembly.6Asked to assess the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons,7 the Court 
had the opportunity, for the first time, ‘to address the legality of nuclear weapons.’8 
Following a comprehensive examination of contrasting areas of international law (jus ad 
bellum and jus in bello), the Court decided that it could not definitively conclude that in every 
circumstance the threat or use of nuclear weapons was axiomatically contrary to international 
law, especially in the context of a state whose survival is in question9. The use of nuclear 
weapons may be used in self-defense only to avert an imminent attack or when it is necessary 
to bring an attack to an end. There must be no practical alternative and the requirement of 
proportionality must be considered. The ICJ did not succeed in giving a definitive answer, 
10but concluded that it could not rule against the lawfulness of the use of nuclear weapons 
except in ‘extreme circumstances of self-defence’11 this became the corner stone for the 
 
4 Advisory Opinion Concerning the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Request for Advisory 
Opinion by the General Assembly of the United Nations), International Court of Justice (ICJ) (1996, Jul 08). 
5 Anti-Balistic Missile Treaty, The Comprehensive-Test-Ban Treaty, Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty 
(START), The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT), the Oter 
Space Treaty and many others   
6 Advisory Opinion supra note 4. 
7 Advisory Opinion supra note 4. 
8 Louise Doswald-Beck ‘International humanitarian law and the advisory opinion of the International Court of 
Justice on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons’ (1997) 37 International Review of the Red Cross. 
9 Yoram Dinstein War, aggression and self-defence 3 ed (2001) at 144–6. 
10 Advisory Opinion supra note 4: “the Court considers that it does not have sufficient elements to enable it to 
conclude with certainty that the use of nuclear weapons would necessarily be at variance with the principles and 
rules of law applicable in armed conflict in any circumstance.” 
11 Advisory Opinion supra note 4, para. 105(2)(E). 
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legality of nuclear weapons.  
II. HOW NUCLEAR WEAPONS HAVE ALTERED THE DOCTRINE OF SELF-
DEFENCE 
The Advisory opinion used two branches of the law jus ad bellum and jus in bello to 
define limitations to using nuclear weapons in self-defence. The Court makes it clear that the 
test for legality is a cumulative one. It has to satisfy the rules on the use of force under the 
UN charter, as well as the rules of armed conflict (IHL). The Court is clear in paragraph 42 
that: 
 
‘a use of force that is proportionate under the law of self-defence, must, in order to be lawful, also meet the 
requirements of the law applicable in armed conflict which comprise in particular the principles and rules of 
humanitarian law.’12 
By doing this the court stated that the use of force is self-defence must be not only governed 
by the UN Charter but also by customary law or principals of IHL such as imminence, 
necessity and proportionality. These three intertwined conditions apply to the use of force. 
The international law regarding nuclear weapons is grounded on humanitarian considerations 
as the use of nuclear weapons ‘seems scarcely reconcilable’13 with IHL and environmental 
law. With the scientific advancements, and the lack of nuclear proliferation, the law related to 
nuclear weapons will surely change. Notably after the atomic bomb dropped over Japan and 
the scientific advances, which has deepened our knowledge of the humanitarian and 
environmental effects of nuclear weapons. The technological advances, have focused the 
legal debate on nonstrategic nuclear weapons (‘low-yield’ or ‘tactical’ variety) which could 
potentially blur the lines between conventional and nuclear weapons.  
In addition, the difficulty of adopting an effective defensive measure after a strategic 
nuclear missile attack has been launched has prompted speculation as to whether pre-emptive 
action is lawful.14  Nuclear Weapons have given rise to states accepting the doctrine of self-
defence. Pre-emptive force is considered illegal under International Law, but an essential 
doctrine for a state confronted by an imminent nuclear attack, allowing the state to take steps 
 
12 Ibid para 42. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Iain Cameron ‘Anti-ballistic missile systems and international law’ in Istvan Pogany (ed.) Nuclear weapons 
and international law (1987). 
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immediately to ensure its national survival.15 Under the NPT, all states have the right to 
peaceful nuclear technology, therefore not all nuclear technologies are threats. Much of the 
technology cannot be detected whether it is used for peaceful purposes such as medicine, 
power generation or similar to the technology used for military purposes. This has led to 
states destroying other states nuclear facilities claiming pre-emptive self-defence as a 
justification. International Law needs to place limits on pre-emptive self-defence instead of 
outlawing the practice completely, but the limits must be specific to nuclear weapons.  
Nuclear weapons pose the greatest threat to ‘international peace and security’ that the 
UN Charter was created to preserve. The International system, including the law needs to be 
adjusted to address the nuclear threat. ‘The traditional threshold of an armed attack seems 
obsolete in the face of a nuclear attack and the requirements of imminence, necessity and 
proportionality need to be relaxed to compensate for the unique threat posed by nuclear 
weapons.’16 State practice and the opinio juris of the international community preludes that 
nuclear weapons have changed the doctrine of self-defence and it requires the UN to redefine 
international law or make a definitive judgement on the legality of nuclear weapons, or set 
limitation on pre-emptive self-defence. There must be a contextual reassessment of the 
indoctrinated and customary right of individual and collective self-defence (discussed below 
in chapter 2), ‘the question ultimately before us must be whether any defensive use or threat 
of the use of nuclear weapons can be justified?’17 
 
CHAPTER 2: SELF-DEFENCE UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW  
 
The prohibition of the use of force by and amongst nations is widely known to be a 
rule of customary international law that has existed and guided the law of nations prior to the 
formation of the UN. Before the creation of the UN Charter there was a general notion of 
‘just war’18, which emerged from religious and philosophic principals and considered the 
justifications of war. War was justified if it met certain conditions such as just cause, force as 
a last resort, the proportionality of the force and distinction that would prevent innocent 
 
15 Waldock, Sir Claud Humphrey Meredith The regulation of the use of force by individual states in 
international law (1952). 
16 David Sloss ‘Forcible arms control: Preemptive attacks on nuclear facilities’ (2003) 4 Chi. J. Int’l L. at 54. 
17 Burns H Weston ‘Nuclear weapons versus international law: A contextual reassessment’ (1982) 28 McGill Lj. 
at 549.  
18 FT Abioye ‘Examining the international law right of self-defence: The case of Russia and Georgia; Israel and 
Gaza’ (2010) 31 Obiter at 400. 
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civilians were spared from violence. 19 Aspects would have evolved into jus ad bello and jus 
ad bellum, vital aspect of international law.  
Then the concept of self-defence was redefined by Webster following the Caroline 
incident (hereafter the Caroline case), using much of the same justifications as in the ‘just 
war’ theory. Webster declared that a state is entitled to take forcible measures in self-defence, 
where it can demonstrate a "necessity . . . instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means 
and no moment for deliberation."20 (This will be discussed in depth in the Chapter 4). Then 
with the aim to restore international peace and security following the world wars, the 
international community adopted the UN Charter.    
In order to substantially discuss self-defence within the context of jus ad bellum it is 
essential to begin with Article 2(4) the prohibition on the use of force and how it exists within 
customary international law. ‘The prohibition on the use of force is the most universally 
accepted fundamental rule of international law and is considered to have jus cogens’21 status. 
There is much debate about whether Article 2(4) was intended to prohibit all uses of force 
which are not explicitly treated as exceptions in the Charter, such as humanitarian 
intervention and national liberation struggles. These topics are beyond the scope of this paper 
and only serve to display that there are legal debates that identify exceptions to the charter. 
Consequently, the use of force outside of the framework of the charter is prima facie illegal, 
apart from the recognized exceptions.  
 
Exceptions to Article 2(4) are Security Council authorization and the inherent right to 
self-defence outlined in Article 51. Article 51 is an exception to the rule of the prohibition of 
the use of force, allowing for an individual and/or collective to use of force in self-defence in 
the case of an armed attack. This individual or collective use of force is allowed to continue 
until such a time as the Security Council takes such actions that are necessary for the 
maintenance of international peace and security.22Article 51 preserves the right to use force 
in self-defence ‘if an armed attack occurs’. This limits the right to circumstances in which a 
real armed attack has taken place23. Unfortunately, Article 51 does not elaborate on what 
 
19 Howard M Hensel (ed.) The legitimate use of military force: The just war tradition and the customary law of 
armed conflict (2008). 
20 British Foreign and State Papers vol. 30 (1841). 
21 Yoram Dinstein War, aggression and self-defence 2 ed (1997).  
22 UN Charter art. 51 ("Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective 
self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council 
has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security."). 
23 The International Court of Justice (ICJ) expressly left open the issue of the lawfulness of a response to the 
threat of an imminent armed attack in the Case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against 
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constitutes as an armed attack only that it is a prerequisite for the lawful exercise of self-
defence. Article 51, seems incomplete, leaving open for debate as to what constitutes as an 
armed attack. Therefore, we must rely on the jurisprudence from the ICJ in the form of state 
practice and opino juris to determine what can be considered as an armed attack.  
The jurisprudence of the ICJ certainly supports Article 51 in that an armed attack is a 
prerequisite for the lawful exercise of self-defence and has attempted to determine potential 
requirements. The court for the first-time tackled self-defence head on, in the Military and 
Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (hereafter Nicaragua)24. In that decision, 
the court provided an extensive analysis of the concept of an armed attack and much of the 
law of self-defence. This case is crucial to this paper, as well as the Case Concerning Oil 
Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America) (hereafter Oil Platforms) 
which determined the ‘scale of force’, the target of the attack, the identity of the attacker and 
the military nature of the attack.  
In both the Nicaragua Case and the Oil Platforms the ICJ held that an armed attack is 
vital in order to trigger self-defence, ‘In the case of individual self-defence, the exercise of 
this right is subject to the state concerned having been a victim of an armed attack’25.  In the 
Oil platforms case, it is reaffirmed the sine qua non condition of an armed attack by holding 
that the USA must legally justify their attack in self-defence on the Iranian platforms by 
showing that Iran was responsible for a previous armed attack. The requirement of an armed 
attack is an evident requirement reaffirmed in later cases: ‘The Legal Consequences of the 
Construction of the Wall in the Occupied Territory26and the DRC v. Uganda case. In the 
DRC v Uganda the court determined that an armed attack is a self-evident requirement’27 
again without defining what constitutes as an armed attack. The ICJ judgements have set a 
relevant standard for assessing the lawfulness of self-defence claims28 by using armed attack 
as the primary benchmark.  
 
Nicaragua (Merits, 1986 ICJ Rep. 14, at para. 194). When the question of the existence of an armed attack 
featured in the Court’s overall reasoning on the law of self-defence, it appeared before the principles of 
necessity and proportionality.  
24 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of America) 
Merits, International Court of Justice (1986, Jun 27). 
25 Nicaragua v United States of America supra note 24. 
26 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, International Court 
of Justice (2003, Dec 08). 
27 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), International 
Court of Justice (2005, Dec 19). 
28 James A Green ‘The ratione temporis elements of self-defence’ (2015) 2 Journal on the Use of Force and 
International Law. 
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With this in mind, there is still uncertainty if an actual armed attack is a requirement in 
the context of nuclear weapons. The concept of a pre-emptive attack was born out of the 
language of the UN Charter; State have an inherent right to act in self-defence. It is 
unrealistic in practice to suppose that self-defence must in all cases await an actual attack. 
This will be discussed later in the chapter (i.2.) as it serves an important issue within the 
context of nuclear weapons. In the meantime, we will examine the fundamental threshold for 
lawful self-defence: an armed attack.  
 
 
I. THRESHOLD OF AN ARMED ATTACK  
 
As to the question of what constitutes an armed attack we have some indication on the 
basis of the Nicaragua case.29 In that judgement, the ICJ relied heavily upon the General 
Assembly’s declaratory resolution known as the ‘Definition of Aggression’ and the particular 
circumstances as well as factual evidence from the Nicaragua case. The ICJ determined that 
an armed attack consisted of a significant direct use of force by a State against another State, 
as well as the sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, militias and the like to carry 
out armed actions against another State; ‘provided such activities were comparable in their 
scale and effects to a conventional armed attack carried out by regular forces’30. This 
however, is a very restrictive formula and doesn’t take into account the different 
circumstances of the use of force specifically terrorism and WMD such as nuclear weapons. 
Because not every use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of a 
state constitutes as an armed attack31, therefore it is necessary to distinguish between them.  
In determining what measures taken can amount to a lawful exercise of self-defence, we 
need to assess the nature of an armed attack in the jurisprudence of the ICJ. In the Nicaragua 
Case the court viewed it as ‘necessary to distinguish the gravest forms of the use of force 
from other less grave forms’.32 Hence, we can conclude that gravity is the primary distinction 
of whether an armed attack has occurred or not.  
In the Nicaragua case, the ICJ differentiated from ‘a mere frontier’ incident to the ‘most 
grave forms of the use of force’, suggesting that the use of force must meet a threshold of 
 
29 Nicaragua v United States of America supra note 24. 
30 Nicaragua v United States of America supra note 24. 
31 Olivier Corten The law against war: The prohibition on the use of force in contemporary international law 
(2010). 
32 Nicaragua v United States of America supra note 24. 
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‘scale and effects’ or intensity in order for it to be regarded as an armed attack for the 
purposes of Article 51. The use of force required to meet the threshold of gravity and 
intensity must be more than ‘mere frontier incidents’ and range from ‘localized border 
encountered between small infantry units’ and a full-scale invasion of its territorial integrity 
or direct destruction of its interests. In other words, “minor violations of the prohibition of the 
use of force falling below the threshold of the notion of armed attack do not justify a 
corresponding minor use of force as self-defence.”33 
Intention has also been used by the court to determine if an armed attack has occurred. In 
the Oil Platforms Case the ICJ made reference to this requirement when it inquired into the 
question whether the USA was able to prove that certain of Iran’s actions were “specifically 
aimed” at the USA or that Iran had “the specific intention” of harming USA vessels34.  This 
suggests that an armed attack does not require to meet a certain threshold of intensity and 
requires only an intention to do harm which seems to contradict the purpose of the UN 
Charter. If intention is the requirement to use force in self-defence then as long as an 
aggressor state indiscriminately attacks a state or its vessels it would trigger self-defence. 
This does not seem to be a valid justification that coincides with the law. It can be inferred 
from the courts judgement that the threshold of gravity is flexible and take into consideration 
the specific considerations of each case.35The requirement of intention is highly criticized 
among the international community.  
 
Although, the ICJ excluded ‘small-scale attacks’, it has been argued in the age of 
terrorism by non-state actors, that every use of force against a state can amount to an armed 
attack. Customary practice gives no clear guidelines as to the scale and effects required for a 
‘frontier incident’ to qualify as an armed attack.36  ‘The USA is an avid supporter of the 
theory that ‘an armed attack means any use of armed force, and does not need to cross some 
threshold of intensity’.37 The accumulation of events theory means that a series of attacks or 
several armed incursions must be views as a whole rather than separate unrelated incidents. 
This theory has implications not only for deciding whether an armed attack has taken place at 
 
33 Enzo Cannizzaro ‘Contextualizing proportionality: jus ad bellum and jus in bello in the Lebanese war’ (2006) 
88 International Review of the Red Cross  
34 Case Concerning Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America), International Court of 
Justice (2003, Nov 06)  
35 Tom Ruys ‘Armed Attack’ and Article 51 of the UN Charter: Evolutions in customary law and practice 
(2010) 
36 Ruys op cit note 35 at 57. 
37 Elizabeth Wilmshurst ‘The Chatham House principles of international law on the use of force in self-defence’ 
(2006) 55 International & Comparative Law Quarterly. 
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all, but whether the victim state may defend itself not only against the use of force which 
triggered its forcible response in self-defence, but against the threat arising from the whole 
series.38 In justifying the use of force in response to cross-border attacks or bombings Israel 
has consistently relied on the ‘accumulation of events theory’.39 Israel’s intervention in 
Lebanon in 2006, Israel claimed they used for in self-defence against, small-scale cross-
border attacks by Hezbollah militants.  Israel conduct was disproportionate however a 
majority of the security council (11/15) accepted in principal that Israel could exercise its 
right to self-defence.40 As well as in the ‘Oil platforms case it used language that suggested 
that the cumulative nature of a series of forcible actions could possibly turn them into an 
‘armed attack’.’41 This theory has not been expressly endorsed by the ICJ or the Security 
Council, in fact it is highly contested and has only gained general acceptance due to the 
increased amount of transnational terrorist attacks. However, it stands to reason that states 
have shown a new willingness to support this theory that would legitimized small-scale 
events as armed attacks under Article 51. The creation of nuclear weapons, beg the question 
that under the consideration of these new threats, self-defence should not be limited to an 
armed attack. To require a state to suffer a such a devastating attack in order to evoke its right 
of self-defence would be unreasonable.  
 
a) POSSIBLE EXCEPTION FOR AN ARMED ATTACK  
 
 
1. TERMINOLOGY  
 
States and scholars tend to use three different terms when discussing the use of force in self- 
defence prior to an armed attack: anticipatory self-defence, pre-emptive self-defence, and 
preventive self-defence. For the purpose of this paper I will use pre-emptive self-defence as it 
is the most used term when discussing the potential threat that nuclear weapons pose. ‘Pre-
emptive self-defence is defined as the use of force in self-defence to halt a particular tangible 
 
38 Case Concerning Oil Platforms supra note 34. 
39 Responding to Herzbollah Attacks from Lebanon: Issues of Proportionality, Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(2006, Jul 25). 
40 United Nations Security Council, 35th Sess., 5493rd mtg, UN Doc S/PV.5493 (2006, Jul 21). 
41 Case Concerning Oil Platforms supra note 34: The Court stated that ‘even if this series of deplorable attacks 
could be regarded as cumulative in character’ they could not be attributed to the DRC and therefore did not give 
licence to Uganda to exercise its right to self-defence against that state. 
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course of action that the potential victim state perceives will shortly evolve into an armed 
attack against it.’42  
 
2. PRE-EMPTIVE USE OF FORCE  
 
Pre-emptive use of force is considered illegal under the UN Charter, the arguments for 
recognizing a right to pre-emptive use of force in the face of an imminent attack rely not only 
on the meaning of the ‘inherent right to self-defence’ recognized in Article 51, nor in 
international customary law (Caroline Case) , but on modern warfare (WMD) and 
international politics.43 With the development of nuclear weapons it would seem illogical to 
maintain that a state facing an imminent attack by an enemy armed with such weapons would 
have to sit by idly and wait for the attack to start before it could defend itself.44 The 
requirement that there be an armed attack is clear, but not without conflict. Divided views 
exist on whether it is permissible for a state to use force in self-defence against an attack 
which has not yet actually begun but is reasonably believed to be imminent. Below we will 
examine two different schools of thought in terms of the language of Article 51.  
 
In accordance with the UN charter, if read strictly the legality of pre-emptive self-defence 
cannot be a lawful because of the requirement of an armed attack. Yoram Dinstein45 and 
scholars46 under the strict school consider the materializing of a threat that is imminent a 
responsibility for the security council and that pre-emptive action can only be used if given 
authorization from the security council. It must be conceded that the strict reading of Article 
51 is not without logic, and may be regarded as consistent with the collective security policy 
adopted in the Charter.47 Under this policy a state facing an imminent attack should not 
engage in forceful action but should request aid from the Security Council. However, given 
that the Security Council has a reputation for being unreliable in carrying out its mandate to 
protect states from threatened or imminent attacks, therefore waiting for Security Council 
authorization is not an appealing option. Especially in the age of nuclear weapons when 
waiting for authorization can have catastrophic consequences.  
 
42 Sean D Murphy ‘The doctrine of preemptive self-defense’ (2005) 50 Vill. L. Rev. at 704. 
43 Rosalyn Higgins Problems and process: International law and how we use it (1995) at 242. 
44 Higgins op cit note 43. 
45 Dinstein op cit note 9. 
46 Philip C Jessup A modern law of nations: An introduction (1968) and Louis Henkin International law: 
politics, values and functions (1989) support the strict reading of the UN Charter. 
47 Corten op cit note 29 at 407–16. 
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A second school of thought accepts pre-emptive self-defence in the face of an ‘imminent 
threat'. The vernacular used in Article 51 implies that states have the ‘inherent right’ of self-
defence in the face of an imminent threat. ‘Whereas parts of the jurisprudence claim that 
Article 51 of the Charter has suppressed this aspect of self-defence by requiring a prior armed 
attack, others claim that the Charter preserves the customary right of self-defence in the word 
‘inherent’.’48This principal of ‘imminence’ relies on ICL and the precedent of the Caroline 
case, which justifies a pre-emptive attack ‘an attack on foreign territory would be justified 
only if the aggressor were able to show a "necessity of self-defence instant, overwhelming, 
and leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation.”49 Imminence becomes the 
requirement for legitimate pre-emptive self-defence. UN Secretary general Kofi Annan 
appointed a High Level Panel of Experts to examine UN reform, after having cited the 
‘restrictive’ language of Article 51, he stated that: “A threatened State, according to long 
established international law, can take military action as long as the threatened attack is 
imminent.”.50 
 
This reflects the opinio juris of states and the need for the UN Charter to be adjusted. 
State practice tends to reflect the evolution of the original restriction outlined in Article 51 by 
justifying pre-emptive self-defence in response to an imminent attack. Most famously, in 
2002 the US produced a National Security Strategy (The Strategy) that clearly argued for the 
propriety of pre-emptive self-defence.51 This is set in the context of terrorist organizations, 
such as al Qaeda, or so-called rogue states, such as Iraq or North Korea, acquiring and 
threatening to use WMD such as chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons.52 The USA even 
went so far as to say that “for centuries, international law recognized that nations need not 
suffer an attack before they can lawfully take action to defend themselves against forces that 
present an imminent danger of attack.”53The Strategy emphasizes the option to use pre-
emptive military strikes to address threats to the USA and its allies before they fully 
 
48 DW Bowett Self-defence in international law (1958) at 182–93. 
49 John Bassett Moore A digest of international law (1906) (quoting Webster’s correspondence to Lord 
Ashburton, a special British representative to Washington in the Caroline dispute). 
50 United Nations The Secretary-General’s High-level Panel Report on threats, challenges and change, A more 
secure world: Our shared responsibility (2004). 
51 2002 US National Security Strategy, 15. Several scholars characterize this argument as one in support of 
preventive—not merely pre-emptive—self-defence. Doyle, Striking First, 25; Ivo Daalder and James Steinberg, 
‘The future of preemption’ (2005) American Interest 1 fn 1. 
52 Thomas Graham Jr ‘National self-defense, international law, and weapons of mass destruction’ (2003) 4 Chi. 
J. Int'l L at 1. 
53 United States The national security strategy of the United States of America (2002), available at 
https://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/nss/nss2002.pdf?ver=2014-06-25-121337-027. 
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materialize, this will be important to note for hypothetical scenario 3. This strategy was 
created in the context or rouge states such as North Korea acquiring and developing their 
nuclear weapons program. Australia, Japan, and the UK have also defended their right to use 
force in certain situations to prevent terrorist or WMD threats from materializing.54 Japan, for 
example, has publicly contemplated using pre-emptive force against North Korea if it has 
strong evidence that North Korea is planning a missile attack against it.55When the 
consequences of an attack with WMD are potentially so devastating, we cannot afford to 
stand idly by as grave dangers materialise. ‘This is the principle and logic behind pre-
emption.’56  
 
3. THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE ICJ  
The Cuban missile crisis of 1962 was one of the first post UN charter examples of pre-
emptive action. During the Cuban missile crisis, the USA made a number of formal legal 
arguments in support of the institution of a “defensive quarantine” in advance of any actual 
Soviet or Cuban use of force. The Security Council deliberated about pre-emption although 
there was no conclusive consensus to support or oppose the doctrine, most of the arguments 
were about if the criteria established under customary law (Caroline Case) were met in this 
case. The delegate from Ghana stated that ‘the threat was of not of such a nature as to warrant 
action on the scale so far taken, prior to a reference to this Council’.57 Essentially the delegate 
accepted the use of pre-emptive force but refused it to be legal based on the principal of 
necessity, which was not met.  
The ICJ has refused to make any judgements regarding pre-emptive self-defence leaving 
the issue open for interpretation. In the Nicaragua, Oil Platforms and DRC v Uganda self-
defence was not explicitly claimed by the parties, so the court although identified pre-
emptive self-defence, decided it was unable to pronounced upon the subject. The ICJ does 
not confirm the lawfulness of pre-emptive self-defence nor affirm that is unlawful. However, 
the lawful use of force in response to a threat contradicts the courts claims that ‘the exercise 
of this the right to self-defence is subject to the state concerned having been the victim of an 
armed attack’.58 Thus the acknowledgement of pre-emptive use of force.  
 
54 Phil Mercer ‘Tensions rise over Australia’s pre-emptive strike policy ahead of ASEAN Summit’ Epoch Times 
26 November 2004. 
55 Anthony Faiola ‘In Japan, tough talk about preemptive capability’ Washington Post 11 July 2006. 
56 United States op cit note 51. 
57 Mr. Quaison-Sackey, quoted in United Nations Security Council, 17th Sess., 1024th mtg, UN Doc S/PV.1024 
(1962, Oct 24). 
58 Nicaragua v United States of America supra note 23 para 35. 
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Having said this, there is also implicit statements made by the ICJ for pre-emptive self-
defence. In the Oil Platforms case, the United States insisted that response to the attacks was 
necessary for self-defence and also to secure against future threats.59 Also in the DRC v 
Uganda case, the court referred in detail to Uganda’s future security and the need to secure 
against future attacks to support their self-defence claim, even though in decision, the court 
clearly states that the self-defence was only taken in a response to actual attacks, it did 
mention the need for pre-emptive measures.60  
Given this brief examination of some important indicators of state practice in the post–
UN Charter period, it would be difficult to conclude that there is an established rule of 
customary international law prohibiting the pre-emptive use of force when undertaken in pre-
emptive self-defence. In light of the presented evidence, it can be concluded that there has 
indeed been a shift in States’ opinio juris insofar as support for pre-emptive self-defence has 
become more widespread and explicit in recent years (post 2001). At the same time, it seems 
a step too far to claim that there exists today widespread acceptance of the legality of self-
defence against so-called ‘imminent’ threat.  
 
II. THE CHANGED NATURE OF THE THREAT: NUCLEAR WEAPONS  
 
In terms of a potential nuclear threat, Article 51 a more tolerant definition of what 
constitutes as an armed attack which includes a possible threat justifying pre-emptive military 
action. But only in very specific circumstances as it could lead to misuse and abuses by 
aggressive or self-serving states.  
 A nuclear threat can reasonably be treated as imminent in circumstances where an 
attack by conventional means would not be so regarded’ because of the extreme risk to a state 
forced to wait until the attack takes place and the impossibility of affording that state’s 
population any effective protection after the attack has been launched.61Waiting for an actual 
nuclear armed attack can be exceedingly dangerous but so can the doctrine of pre-emptive 
use of force. For example, the use of force by Israel on the Osiraq nuclear power reactor in 
Iraq in 1981, was considered an illegal act under international law and received much 
condemnation. Israel claimed the right of pre-emptive self-defence, asserting that an 
 
59 Case Concerning Oil Platforms supra note 34 paras 4.27–4.30. 
60 DRC v. Uganda supra note 26 para 143. 
61 Christopher Greenwood ‘International law and the pre-emptive use of force: Afghanistan, Al-Qaida, and Iraq’ 
(2003) 4 San Diego Int'l LJ 7 at 16. 
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operational reactor would be a step in the direction of Iraq acquiring nuclear weapons, which 
would pose a direct and immediate threat to Israel.62 Even though Iraq refuses to recognize 
Israel’s existence and its continuously endorsing and committing violence against Israel, even 
though Iraq was on a path to creating nuclear weapons that could be used against Israel, and 
even though it could be justified and consistent with the Caroline case, Israel’s actions was 
strongly condemned by the Security council and international community through resolution 
487. An “armed attack in such circumstances cannot be justified as it represents a grave 
breach of international law."63 The initiation of a nuclear program did not constitute as an 
‘imminent threat’. Despite that, Israel’s actions resonated with states and made them question 
the consequences of delinquent states or terrorists acquiring nuclear weapons, it was change 
the status quo and make the nuclear non-proliferation regimes obsolete.  
As we can see by Israel’s actions against Syria in 2007, received a different response 
from the international community. Implying that the opinio juris of states had evolved. Israel 
bombed an industrial facility, which was housing a nuclear reactor, near al Kibar in Syria.64 
The same defence was used to justify pre-emptive self-defence but very little outcry or 
criticism was received from the international community. There are several factors that could 
explain the radically different reactions of Osirak and Kibar. Iraq, was public about its 
facilities and allowed the IAEA to inspect the facilities. Syria on the other hand was building 
the nuclear reactor in secrecy with the aid of North Korea, another delinquent state. Another 
different between the two operations was the intention of the nuclear reactor, the Nork 
Korean built reactor in Syria was designed to produce nuclear weapons (produced plutonium) 
while there was no significant proof that Iraq was building a reactor for the purpose of 
producing weapons, in fact it could have been used for energy (peaceful means).  
However, the difference between the two operations is not significant and one can 
only assume that the spread of nuclear weapons in the last decade has place pressure on 
Article 51 and that the proliferation of nuclear technology to rogue states raises concerns.65 
Consequently, the threat of nuclear weapons in the hands of states with a reputation of 
 
62 Graham op cit note 50 at 11. 
63 Bruce Ackerman ‘But what’s the legal case for preemption?’ Wash Post 18 Aug 2002. 
64 Leonard S Spector & Avner Cohen ‘Israel's Airstrike on Syria's Reactor: Implications for the Non-
proliferation Regime’ (2008) 38 Arms Control Today. 
65 Matthew C Waxman ‘The use of force against states that might have weapons of mass destruction’ (2009) 31 
Mich. J. Int'l L at 9–10. 
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unpredictable and irrational behaviour has caused states to adjust their views of the propriety 
of pre-emptive self-defence against such a threat.66  
In summary, pre-emptive self-defence has not been expressly excluded from Article 
51, in my opinion international law in order to be sustainable to address contemporary threats 
permits pre-emptive self-defence and the question becomes what constraints or circumstances 
can such a right be exercised. And while pre-emptive self-defence is generally unlawful, it is 
not necessarily unlawful in all circumstances, the ‘matter depending on the facts of the 
situation including in particular the gravity and consequential nature of the threat and the 
degree to which pre-emptive action is really necessary and is the only way of avoiding that 
serious threat.’67 
From the above it can be said that pre-emptive self-defence is changing into a more 
accepted practice within customary as well as of the UN law on self-defence.68 Although it is 
true that contemporary international law dealing with the possibility to use force in self-
defence does not adequately address the problem of WMD and terrorism, no clear legal 
standard has yet emerged to determine when pre-emptive force would be permissible in such 
cases.69 Incidentally the law has focused on the force used meeting the required criteria 
significantly imminence, necessity and proportionality which are even more pressing in 
relation to pre-emptive self-defence than they are in other circumstances.   
 
CHAPTER 3: REQUIREMENTS OF IMMINENCE, NECESSITY AND 
PROPORTIONALITY 
   
Although, the focal point of the courts jurisprudence is an armed attack, the court has 
been consistent in requiring restrictions of imminence, necessity and proportionality across 
its relevant judgements. Indeed, as the Court pronounced, ‘the right of self-defence under 
Article 51 of the Charter was subject to the limitations of proportionality and necessity’-the 
proportionality element in particular is crucial to such a discussion70.Explicit reference was 
made to these principals in the Nicaragua case, the Oil Platform, Armed Activities on the 
 
66 Andrew Garwood-Gowers ‘Israel’s airstrike on Syria’s Al-Kibar Facility: A test case for the doctrine of pre-
emptive self-defence?’ (2011) 16 Journal of Conflict & Security Law. 
67 Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts Oppenheim’s International Law, Volume I: Peace 9 ed (1992) at 421–2. 
68 ‘Pre-emptive self-defence has been endorsed by the Dutch government’ (2008) 39 Netherlands Yearbook of 
International Law. 
69 Anthony Clark Arend ‘International law and the preemptive use of military force’ (2003) 26.2 The 
Washington Quarterly at 89–103. 
70 Christopher Greenwood ‘Self-defence and the conduct of international armed conflict’ in Yoram Dinstein 
(ed.) International Law at a Time of Perplexity: Essays in Honour of Shabtai Rosenne (1989). 
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Territory of the Congo (hereafter DRC v Uganda) and the Advisory opinion. The Advisory 
opinion is a crucial case regarding the legality of nuclear weapons in which the ICJ declared 
that: ‘The submission of the exercise of the right to self-defence to the conditions of necessity 
and proportionality is a rule of customary law.’71 Given that the criteria do not exist within 
the UN Charter, this chapter involves the evaluation of international customary law and ICJ 
judgements. Starting with the Caroline case which is generally regarded as the reference 
point for any discussion of the criteria governing the use of force in self-defence. The 
Caroline Case outlined a formula for which actions of self-defence should be balanced 
against before armed attack was conceived in international legal vernacular.  
 
I. THE CAROLINE CASE  
 
In 1837, an attempted rebellion transpired against the British empire in Canada. The 
Leader of the failed rebellion escaped to the USA. He drew support from empathetic people 
in the USA and created a rebel force which he stationed on Navy Island, located in British 
territory. They were incidentally supplied with personnel, food and weapons by the US 
steamboat the Caroline. Tensions were high between rebels and British-Canadian forces and 
on the 29 December, while the Caroline was docked on US territory, it was attacked and 
consequently set on fire and towed over Niagara Falls72 by British-Canadian forces.  In the 
process one person was killed, a USA citizen. The death of a national and territorial 
infringement caused uproar in the USA in which they demanded reparations. However, 
Britain claimed that the attack was an act of ‘self-defence’ stating that ‘the necessity of self-
defence and self-preservation, under which Her Majesty’s subjects acted on destroying the 
Caroline, was sufficiently established’.73 To which the USA responded that the British forces 
were in ‘no imminent danger, and therefore could not claim to have acted in self-defence’.74 
Correspondence continued for five years until the USA and Britain finally come to an 
agreement. During negotiations, US Secretary of State Daniel Webster, as part of the 
settlement, defined the conditions of necessity and proportionality that determine a legitimate 
action in self-defence.75 It was Webster that developed the concept of self-defence in general 
 
71 Advisory Opinion supra note 3 para 41. 
72 Robert Y Jennings ‘The Caroline and McLeod Cases’ (1938) 32 American Journal of International Law at 
82–4. 
73 Letter dated 6 February 1838 from Henry S Fox to John Forsyth, FO Doc 5/322. 
74 Letter dated 22 May 1838 from Andrew Stevenson to Lord Palmerston, FO Doc 5/327. 
75 Graham op cit note 50. 
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international law in the 19th century. He gave birth to the Caroline formula which has become 
the locus classicus of the law of self-defence.76  
A state would have to demonstrate that the "necessity of self-defence instant, 
overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation."77 In other 
words; the state would first have to prove that the use of force by an aggressor was imminent 
and that there was no other course besides forcible action to forestall such an attack 
(imminence). Second that the state seeking to exercise force in self-defence would need to 
demonstrate necessity (necessity). And third that the force used in self-defence would be 
obligated to respond in a manner proportionate to the threat or desired end (proportionality). 
Thus, Webster devised a formula that had three principals that must be met for an act of self-
defence to be regarded as lawful. Immediacy, necessity and proportionality.  
It must be noted that the concept of immediacy was introduced in accordance with pre-
emptive self-defence and has been received more acceptance with the emergence of WMD 
and terrorism. The pre-emptive doctrine became a topic in foreign police and international 
law as a solution to immediate threats. The Caroline case has been criticized for being a 
formula for only pre-emptive self defence claims as the rebels on Navy island had not yet 
launched an attack. It is a rather evident formula for the justification of pre-emptive self-
defence but it is also evident that through state practice and ICJ judgments the criteria of 
imminence, necessity and proportionality are not restricted to pre-emptive self-defence in this 
way. It is generally accepted that the Caroline formula is applied to all actions of self-
defence.  
 
a) OPINIO JURIS  
 
Incidentally states have rarely invoked the Caroline case in relation to their self defence 
claims, instead recalling the principals of imminence, necessity and proportionality to justify 
their actions in self-defence. The Caroline case has been referred to on several occasions, 
such as by Iraq in 198078 and similarly by Israel in 197679 as well as in 198180. Even though 
the Caroline formula has not been used frequently in the UN era it does not mean that it is not 
part of contemporary customary law. In fact, states using the criteria determined by the 
 
76 Jennings op cit note 72 at 92. 
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78 United Nations Security Council, 38th Sess., 8285th mtg, UN Doc S/PV.8285 (1980, Oct 15). 
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Caroline formula is determined opinion juris in itself and sufficient to claim ICL status. It is 
undeniable that state practice supports the ‘necessity’ and ‘proportionality ‘criteria. In the 
same Israel case of 1981, many states condemned Israel due to the fact that its actions did not 
meet the requirements outlined in the Caroline Formula. The United Kingdom delegate, Sir 
Anthony Parsons, contended that the Israeli operation violated international law insofar as 
"[t]here was no instant or overwhelming necessity for self- defence."81 
Sierra Leone quoted approvingly from the Caroline: "as for the principle of self- defence, 
it has long been accepted that, for it to be invoked or justified the necessity for action must be 
instant, overwhelming and leaving no choice of means and no moment for deliberation. '82 
Irrespective, the Caroline sets a precedent, and has played a crucial role in state justification 
of self-defence.  
 
b. THE INEXORABLE LINKS BETWEEN THE CRITERIA 
 
It should be noted that imminence, necessity and proportionality are cumulative, and 
if one of them is not satisfied then the state is deemed a violator of the law.83 The existence of 
these legal principals, although not absolutely defined, provide general restraints on decision-
makers when considering force in self-defence. Even in the Caroline case, all three 
requirements were dependent on each other.  
In general, the principals of necessity and proportionality both have a temporal 
connection. This temporal connection is the need for immediate action in the face of an attack 
that has already occurred or pre-emptive action. Either way, every state that have claimed 
self-defence has invoked the criteria of imminence, necessity and proportionality to some 
degree.84 An act of self-defence can only be necessary if it is imminent and the means can 
only be proportionate when they are necessary to achieve the legitimate ends.85These factors 
all together constitute as a minimum test by which to determine the lawful use of force in 
self-defence. In the next section, each principal will be examined thoroughly.  
 
 
81 UNSC supra note 79. 
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c. THE COMTEMPORARY CONTEXT OF THE CAROLINE FORMULA  
 
It has been argued that the Caroline formula should be redefined in terms of 
contemporary threats. The exercise of the inherent right to self-defence with regard to nuclear 
weapons has certainly altered the traditional conceptions of the criteria. It is argued that the 
Caroline formula in itself does not represent the criteria of imminence, necessity and 
proportionality as they are today.86  
The following section examines the usefulness of the Caroline criteria of imminence, 
necessity and proportionality in the light of contemporary threats. By examining each 
criterion individually, we will be able to examine if they reflect the realities of today's world 
of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction.87 
 
II. IMMINENCE  
 
Imminence is a temporal element but does not necessarily exist outside of necessity and 
proportionality. Measures taken in self-defence should be ‘temporally proximate’ meaning 
there should be no delay in the use of force. There are various ratione temporis elements 
underpinning the lawful exercise of the right of self-defence, the timeline between the initial 
attack and response are notably controversial.88 Nonetheless, self- defense has a definite 
temporal element that directly relates to assessments of the lawful exercise of the 
right.89Also, in terms of pre-emptive self-defence,  in order for imminence to be triggered, 
there must be ‘a specific and identifiable threat, which is highly likely to occur’90 or have just 
occurred. In other words, it must effectively fall somewhere ‘between (1) absolute certainty 
of a future attack (which is impossible); and (2) a threat that is not specific, objectively 
verifiable and already being prepared (which would thus not be sufficiently “imminent”)’.91 
The requirement of imminence plays a critical role in assessing the seriousness of the threat, 
the necessary response and proportionality of the lethal response and the availability of legal 
alternatives92.The reason for the contention that ‘self-defence is subject to a requirement of 
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immediate exercise following the occurrence of an armed attack, or the manifestation of a 
threat of armed attack can be accredited to the understandable desire to have a clear 
distinction between the right of self-defence which is recognized under the Charter and under 
customary international law as lawful, and the concept of pre-emptive use of force, which has 
no legal basis under contemporary international law’93. Therefore, we must analyse two 
distinct definitions of imminence; imminence as one of the conditions for the exercise of self-
defence in a more general sense94 and secondly, we will examine how immediacy will 
primarily be used in relation to the notion of an imminent threat of attack from nuclear 
weapons within the context of pre-emptive self-defence.  
 
a. GENERAL REQUIREMENT  
 
 Here we will discuss the timeline of a state’s defensive action and the obligation for 
an ‘immediate’ response. Returning to the Caroline case, Webster held that self-defence can 
only be exercised in situations when the threat is ‘instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice 
of means, and no moment for deliberation’. This phrase indicates the relevance of a time 
frame for self-defence.  
In this sense imminence is measured by the difference between the point at which a state is 
notified of a ‘pending attack and the point at which the attack has occurred and its impact 
materializes’.95 The requirement of imminence in the traditional sense means that the use of 
force must be directly following threats or acts of aggression for them to be legitimate actions 
of self-defence.  A state of irreversible emergency must exist. The temporal element in 
important as waiting too long to respond to an attack can negate the legitimacy of a self-
defence claim. The responding State is placed under a temporal restriction—there must be a 
reasonable temporal proximity between the victim State’s response and the armed attack 
itself.96 The concept of the parameter of reasonableness is vague and open to interpretation 
particularly in terms of ‘a context-specific appraisal of the various factors that may delay a 
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self-defence action: intelligence gathering, initial resort to negotiation, geographical 
disparity, and so on’.97  
 Such as in the Nicaragua case, the court stated that the actions of the USA could not 
be considered necessary as the investigation of the attacks from El Salvador happed months 
after they actually took place thus invalidating the response. Here necessity was linked to a 
temporal limit for legitimacy. But a time frame is unclear, it has not been defined in 
international law, in the above months were seen as too far from the initial attack but below 
the British took 23 days to respond and it was regarded as lawful self-defence. The delayed 
British response to the Argentinian attack and occupation of the Falklands Islands was 
accepted due to the geographical location as well as the “occupation” following the invasion. 
Geographically, time was needed to mobilize a force necessary to respond. It would seem 
that the court has linked the geographic location to the response time making the principal of 
Imminence dependent on the location. The need for an immediate response seems to be 
flexible and depends on the initial attack. As an investigation, negotiations and mobilizing a 
necessary force can create delays. Certainly, the requirement to act immediately following an 
attack is not absolute and will depend on the specific circumstance.  
The time it takes a state to respond depends on a few issues as stated above, it is also 
important to note that self-defence taken a long time after the fact negates the imminence 
principal.98 This is an obvious requirement as excessively tardy responses will likely be 
interpreted as indicating that there was no genuine immediate need to respond.99 For 
example, the 1986 attacks by South Africa against the African National Congress (ANC) 
were considered unnecessary because South Africa had suffered no attacks by the ANC in 
weeks, therefore the was no need for immediate action. In this sense imminence restricts the 
use of military force to the attainment of legitimate military objectives and when this purpose 
is achieved, Therefore, when an enemy has been conquered or has no abilities to continue the 
fight, the use of force should cease.  
 A response may become illegitimate and no longer meet the requirements of 
proportionality if it continues past the point in time that is necessary to deal effectively with 
the armed attack. Imminence is the temporal aspect that proportionality and necessity depend 
on. If the action of self-defence continues long after the threat has been dealt with it no longer 
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meets the imminence requirement. In the case of the USA in Granada, even if the actions of 
the USA fall under legitimate self-defence, the fact remains that the forces remained in place 
some period after the initial invasion and thus exceeded the imminence requirement and the 
invasion was then regarded as disproportionate.  
Whether the attack is ‘imminent’ also depends upon the nature of the threat and the 
possibility of dealing effectively with it at any given stage. Factors that may be taken into 
account include: the gravity100 of the threatened attack – how sever will the attack be and 
whether what is threatened is the catastrophic use of nuclear weapons. ‘That is why the in the 
context of nuclear weapons criterion of imminence implies that any further delay in 
countering the intended attack will result in the inability of the defending state effectively to 
defend itself against the attack’.101 The traditional temporal element is diminished slightly 
and a new interpretation evolves. This framework is less restrictive in the light to 
technological advancements. For this reason, the traditional imminence requirement of self-
defense must be relaxed to compensate for the unique threat posed by nuclear weapons, and 
can be replaced with other limits on the use of pre-emptive self-defense.  
 
b.  JUSTIFICATION FOR PRE-EMPTIVE SELF DEFENCE   
 
It chapter 2, it was determined that the international community recognizes that 
nations need not suffer an attack before they can lawfully take action to defend themselves 
against forces that present an imminent danger of attack. The adoption of more destructive 
weapons and new methods of warfare requires that self-defence should not be limited only to 
an armed attack. It should be adapted to new circumstances in which the force is used. To 
require a state to suffer a devastating attack in order to invoke its right of self-defence would 
be unreasonable. Moreover, developments in the contemporary weaponry allow delivering a 
fatal blow against a state more rapidly than before reducing the geographical limitations 
imposed by the temporal proxy. Therefore, states faced with an exigency to use force in self-
defence should not be required to act as easy targets. ‘The threat must be legitimate and most 
often there must be a visible mobilization or the preparing to attack and or public threats must 
be made. Although, pre-emptive self-defence is regarded as illegal under international law, it 
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is not necessarily unlawful in all circumstances, the matter depending on the facts of the 
situation including in particular the seriousness of the threat and the degree to which pre-
emptive action is really necessary and is the only way of avoiding that serious threat.’102 
In the light of nuclear weapons the criterion of immediacy has often been criticised as 
it requires states to use force as the last possible point on the timeline, when there is no 
alternative. Nuclear weapons however, create a large incentive for states to use force before a 
threat meets the legal threshold of imminence.103 A threat is imminent if it is about to 
materialize or excepted to occur within a short timeframe. With nuclear weapons, especially 
in the hands of rouge states, the imminence requirement requires waiting too late until a 
nuclear threat has developed to its full capacity. It can also be very difficult to determine 
whether a state possesses WMD, and by the time its use is imminent, it could be extremely 
difficult for a state to mount an effective defence.104Therefore, the traditional temporal 
understanding of imminence is inadequate to deal with nuclear weapons, especially as with 
rouge states the inability to gain accurate intelligence regarding the development of their 
nuclear program such as North Korea. So, even though pre-emptive self-defence in not 
explicitly accepted in international law, states have often supported the doctrine in general 
with compliance of the concept of imminence as a vital part of any attempt to establish the 
lawfulness of such an action.105 It is doubtful whether the present concept of demonstrable 
imminence, and hence that of permissible interception, is adequate for an attack with nuclear 
weapons, especially when delivered with missiles, because that attack has a distinct quality: it 
may cripple the State as a whole and annihilate its capacity to defend itself if it is not blocked 
in time. 
Various states support the imminent threat claim and have used this as a justification 
for pre-emptive self-defence. Such as United Kingdom actions in Jordan106 and Pakistani use 
of force in Kashmir as well as USA in Iraq, all responses were justified using the imminence 
requirement. The classic example of justifying pre-emptive self-defence based on an 
imminent threat posed by the Osiraq nuclear reactor. Israel explicitly justified their attacks 
upon the Iraqi Osiraq nuclear reactor as a response to an immediate threat.107 As Iraq had not 
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developed nuclear weapons yet, Israel claimed that although an actual nuclear strike was not 
imminent, Iraq as an anti-Semitic state and its policies against Israel provided a significant 
threat and if they acquired nuclear weapons would pose a very real and immediate threat to 
Israel’s security and interests. This action was seen as highly contradictory and almost 
entirely condemned by the international community as plutonium production and uranium 
enrichment are not threats in and of themselves, and as indirect threats, they are not 
imminently threatening in the traditional sense. However, the ICJ has stated that, ‘possession 
of nuclear weapons may indeed justify an inference of prepared- ness to use them.’ It follows 
that preparation to make a nu- clear weapon can also justify an inference of preparedness to 
use them.108 Thus, some argue that the UN recognizes the legitimacy of destroying nuclear 
facilities in pre-emptive self-defense as it is undisputed that most states practice this form of 
pre-emptive self-defence. State practice recognizes this practice as legitimate. Another 
example is the USA invasion of Iraq in 2003 in order to eradicate its nuclear weapons 
program. Even though the claim of preemptive self-defence has not been made since the 
inception of the UN charter, states practice has contradicted this with states referring to an 
imminent threat as a justification for using force in self-defence. In both cases the imminent 
threat of nuclear weapons was used as a justification for a pre-emptive self-defence. Even 
though both acts were criticized by the international community, state practice continuously 
suggests that belligerent state’s development of a nuclear reactor is regarded as an imminent 
threat to peace and security. As seen in both examples above and an older one The Cuban 
Missile Crises, 1962.  
 In summary, because it is hard to define imminence, especially in the light of current 
threats which cannot be traced fully from their initial stages of formation, imminence needs 
to be reconceptualised. The concept of imminent threat must be redefined to fit the 
capabilities and objectives of today's adversaries. Belligerent states and terrorists to not 
follow basic IHL or are constrained by the regulations of the UN or law. The continuing 
development of nuclear technology and the myriad of uses available make it increasingly 
difficult to determine the purposes or intent making it extremely difficult to detect, rendering 
the situation manifestly imminent.109 Now due to the nature of modern threats, it is crucial to 
understand how imminence is addressed as it is the first stage of determining if self-defence 
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is lawful or not. The traditional method was solely determined in temporal terms referring to 
the proximity of the threat110, but now the use of factual evidence is taken into consideration.  
 
III. NECESSITY  
 
The legality of the use of force in self-defence depends inter alia on necessity. The 
criterion of necessity is fundamental to the law of self-defence. Force in self-defence may be 
used only when it is necessary to end or avert an attack. Thus, all peaceful means of ending 
or averting the attack must have been exhausted or be unavailable.111Necessity is generally 
regarded as the reasonable response to an attack, either as a last resort or a response to an 
emergency that justifies extraordinary action in order to protect the state or essential interests 
that are in danger of being irreparably damaged.   
The current interpretation of necessity is two-fold: (1) the State must demonstrate that it 
exhausted all non-forcible measures112 and (2) that force is necessary to avert an unjustified 
attack.113  
 
a. LAST RESORT 
 
To understand the principal of necessity as a ‘last resort’ it is usefully to start with the 
Caroline case, Webster claimed that the need to respond in self-defence must be 
‘overwhelming’ and ‘no choice of means’. In this context, it can be argued that the formula 
indicates that in order to evoke self-defence the attack must be of a nature as to threaten a 
state’s survival or vital interests. This would mean attacks that have a detrimental effect upon 
a State would not necessitate a response unless they impinge upon the continuous existence 
of a State.114 ‘Invocation of a state of necessity is construed as meaning a claim that a State 
finds itself in a situation where the sole means of safeguarding an essential interest of the 
State, when threatened by a grave and imminent peril, is to adopt conduct not in conformity 
with what is required of the State by an international obligation, owed to another State’.115 
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In terms of the Advisory Opinion, the use of nuclear weapons is only permitted in extreme 
cases of self-defence which therefore could be adopted that a response in self-defence can 
only be necessary when the survival of the state is at risk.116 Although, it had not been 
suggested by the ICJ or UN in other situations so we can assume it is only in terms of nuclear 
weapons as the necessity clause has not been limited to state survival in the jurisprudence of 
the court. In reality, nothing as devastating as state survival is required before a response can 
be seen as legally necessary. In the Nicaragua and Oil Platforms opinions, the necessity 
principal is not restricted to extreme cases of state survival. In practice, nothing so 
devastating as survival is required before a response is legally necessary.117 With this in 
mind, the principal of necessity is not absolute and does not require the state to defend itself 
from total destruction.  
 
Sometimes, states refer to the use of self-defence as vital to secure and protect their ‘vital 
interests’. Therefore, it must be noted that, not only the physical existence of the state but a 
host of interests belonging to the political, economic, legal, and social sphere of the state that 
deserve protection.118 The ‘vital interest’ of a state need not concern the survival of the 
state.119  
Alternative means of settling the dispute must be considered before forceful action is 
taken to liberate the occupied territory.120Specifically, a forcible reprisal must be considered 
as the last resort, and that no alternative to force existed. 121 In other words, there must be an 
attempt at a non-military alternative to the proposed use of force that could potentially end or 
avert an attack. This implies that a State must exhaust all other measures to avert the use of 
force, such as diplomatic negotiations, imposing economic sanctions or unarmed intervention 
by the UN SC.122 Furthermore, states must also exhibit that both the external threat is real and 
that peaceful means have been exhausted.123 Even though necessity doesn’t have to be 
absolute it is considered to be a last resort, a state can use fore in self-defence only if there is 
 
116 Advisory Opinion supra note 4. 
117 Dinstein op cit note 9 at 175. 
118 LG&E Energy Corp., LG&E Capital Corp., and LG&E International, Inc. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/02/1 (2006, Oct 03) para 251. 
119 Roman Boed ‘State of necessity as a justification for internationally wrongful conduct’ (2000) 3 Yale Hum. 
Rts. & Dev. LJ at 15. 
120 J Gardam Necessity, proportionality and the use of force by states vol. 35 (2004) at 1656. 
121 John Quigley ‘The Afghanistan War and self-defense’ (2002) 37 Val. UL Rev. 
122  LawTeacher ‘Overview of the doctrine of self defence’ November 2013, available at 
https://www.lawteacher.net/free-law-essays/international-law/overview-of-the-doctrine-of-self-defence-
international-law-essay.php?vref=1 
123 Ibid. 
27 
 
no other option. For example, in the Six Day War, Israel stressed that only when there was no 
alternative did they responded with force. Claiming in front of the security council that 
“despite the mounting threats from terrorists, it refrained from action in the hope of securing 
a peaceful settlement.”124 Similarly the Tunisian government in their attempt to remove 
French troops from its territory in 1958, maintained that ‘it did everything in its power to 
avoid aggravating the situation.125 The requirement of seeking a peaceful resolution prior to 
using force is essential, in the Oil Platforms case, the ICJ did not find the actions of the USA 
necessary due to the fact that they never made an official complaint regarding Iran’s military 
activities.126 The USA didn’t even give Iran an opportunity to negotiate. Similarly in 2002 
when South Korea claimed that its naval clash with North Korea was necessary, as it had 
provided ample warning and gave the North Korean vessel time and an opportunity to 
respond, hence satisfying the attempt to negotiate.127  Regarding the necessity 
principal, war always entails destruction and human suffering, therefore if there is a less 
harmful method to achieve a state’s goal, it is obligated to attempt that first. 128The necessity 
principal does not procedurally require that other measures – negotiation, for example – must 
first be attempted, although where such an attempt is made and yet fails this may be 
indicative of the necessity of a forcible response.129 For example, in 2001, The USA made 
several demands to the Taliban in Afghanistan. These demands were rejected and the USA 
used their failed attempts at “negotiating” as satisfying the necessity clause thus constituting 
lawful self-defence.130When a state suffers an attack against its territory and threaten the 
structure and institutions of a state, the armed attack itself acts as an extremely evident 
demonstration for the necessity of a response.   
 
b. FORCE IS NECESSARY TO AVERT AN UNJUSTIFIED ATTACK 
 
Necessity is satisfied if and only if the harm inflicted necessary to avert the threat 
faced. There must be a balancing of rights and interests of states against the general 
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prohibition of force.131 It may be the case that that a large scaled attack has occurred or an 
invasion of territory, in these circumstances a state has suffered an attack of such character, it 
would be unreasonable to expect it to employ means other than force in self-defence. The 
Caroline case also stipulated that the attacked state has ‘no choice of means’ available other 
than force to defend itself.132 Action involving armed force, such as an invasion, is a 
legitimate trigger of self-defence only if there is no practical alternative to such an action, 
such as appeal to the authorities or an international organization.133 The occurrence of an 
armed attack will meet the test of necessity, such as where a state is subjected to an ongoing 
armed attack can demonstrate that there is no reasonable prospect of the efficacy of peaceful 
measures of settlement. This was experienced by Kuwait during the Persian Gulf conflict 
1990-91134. Alas, this is not always the case, if a threat is not imminent or ongoing and there 
is time for diplomatic intervention or the potential to resolve a conflict peacefully, then the 
state is under the obligation to settle the dispute peacefully. The whole point of the UN 
charter is to ‘prevent future generations from the scourge of war’. The reason is that states 
must exhaust all viable peaceful options before resorting to the use of force.  
In summary, all reasonable alternative measures should have been exhausted prior to the 
use of force and the requirement of necessity implies that there must be a significant level of 
reliability concerning an aggression. ‘It has been stated that a victim state may legally use 
counter military force if it has prudent grounds to believe that the use of force is the only way 
to conquer the aggressor and to diminish or completely eliminate the threat of future 
attacks’135. It can be said that necessity not only restricts the circumstances in which force 
may be used in self-defence, but it also puts the limit on the duration of the counter force. 
The continuing validity of the forceful response now depends on its proportionality to the 
legitimate aims of self-defence.  
 
IV. PROPORTIONALITY 
The principal of proportionality plays a central role in both jus in bello and jus ad bellum. 
In jus in bello the meaning of the principle itself is quite clear; it involves assessing whether 
the expected collateral damage to civilians and civilian objects of an attack on a legitimate 
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military target is excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage 
anticipated.136 In jus ad bellum it is also one of the factors that determine whether the use of 
force in self-defence is justified. Compliance with the principle of proportionality requires 
that the ‘force employed must not be excessive with regard to the goal of abating or repelling 
the attack’.137 ‘Generally, under jus ad bellum, proportionality requires a consideration of 
matters such as the geographical and destructive scope of the response, the selection of means 
and methods of warfare and targets and the effects on their states’.138 Proportionality is the 
resort to and the scale of force and must be judged against the legitimate end of using force or 
in relation to the threat of force.139 
Looking at the Caroline case, the term ‘excessive’ which has been interpreted as the principal 
of proportionality, it is unclear whether this refers to either or both interpretations above. 
There for we must look at the post-UN charter era to determine what states or the ICJ refer to 
proportionality as. The ICJ has confirmed that it is a well-established rule of customary 
international law that a use of force in self-defence must be ‘proportional to the armed attack 
and necessary to respond to it.’  Therefore, there are two conditions essential to 
proportionality which cannot be divorced from one another, and in reality both of them affect 
whether the use of force in self-defence can be considered proportionate.  1. The scale and 
means of the attack being responded to (in terms of destruction of life and property)140 or, 2. 
The defensive requirements of the defending state (meaning that the measures taken are 
proportional to the ultimate goal of abating the attack suffered). Together they established a 
relationship between the threat and response. 
a. THE SCALE AND MEANS   
The principle of proportionality under the ‘scale and means’ interpretation requires 
that the degree of force used in self-defence must be commensurate with the ends to be 
achieved, such that every self-defence measure should be quantified by the scale of the 
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unlawful act which provoked it.141This condition requires a state using coercive measures in 
self-defence must correspond to quantitative characteristics of the aggression, such as the 
extent of the attack, the type of weapons used and the size of the damage.142 An important 
point, in this regard, is civilian casualties. It is thought that proportionality necessitates that 
potential civilian casualties must be balanced, basically the link between jus ad bellum and 
jus ad bello must be satisfied. If the significance of a response does not commensurate with 
the loss of live or destruction of civilian possession, a state should not undertake that 
action143. This interpretation of “necessity” in a self-defence context is closely linked to the 
scale of the attack or threatened attack and the idea of prospective proportionality, i.e., what 
is necessary to effectively address the attack or threatened attack. 
 
A state using force in self-defence would not inflict unnecessary harm, while trying to 
achieve its aim. An important point, in this regard, is civilian casualties. It is thought that 
potential civilian casualties must be balanced. If the significance of a response does not 
commensurate with the loss of live or destruction of civilian possession, a state should not 
undertake that action. This condition of proportionality requires that the degree of force used 
in self-defence must be equivalent to the desired end result or that every self-defence measure 
should be quantified by the scale of the unlawful act which provoked it.144  
  ‘Proportionality in coercion relies on the scale of force should be taken into account 
as attacks that are disproportionate such as regime change are unlikely to be legally 
proportional’145. For example, the USA invasion and occupation of Iraq, and the replacement 
of its system of government, could not have been covered by the law of self-defence on the 
argument that that was the only way to deal effectively with the threat posed to neighbouring 
states (for example, Israel) by Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction. The proportionality 
requirement cannot be met if the harms of any use of force outweighs its benefits.  
State practice has often used the scale and means approach. Such as the USA in 
Grenada 1983146 and the USA in Panama 1989, both which were condemned as 
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disproportional147. The USA invasion of Panama was on the basis of exercising the right to 
self-defence to protect its nationals. The acts alleged prompting this reprisal was the death of 
one USA solider and the threat to do more harm to other soldiers. The USA responded with a 
full-scale invasion, resulting in significant civilian casualties, destruction of property and the 
overthrow of the government of General Noriga.148 As the scale of force used to achieve the 
desired end result were excessive and unjustified. Once the attack has been abated, any 
military response after will no longer be considered proportionate. The East Pakistan conflict 
of 1971, India’s force used in self-defence was considered disproportionate considering the 
scale of activity by Pakistan149. Again, the scale of action taken by Israel in the conflict with 
Lebanon in 1972150 was considered disproportionate. As well in relation to the 2002 Korean 
naval clash, North Korean argued that it had responded in self-defence151 justifying 
proportionately in terms of means and scale.  Thus, much of state practice solves the self-
defence equation by assessing proportionality by referencing the scale of an attack that has 
already been initiated and the harm in the process of being done.  An assessment of what will 
achieve the end result of self-defence, ‘that of halting and repelling the attack’, consists 
neither merely of a comparison of weapons or the scale of force used152 nor ‘the forms, 
substance and strength of the action itself.153  
The requirements of proportionality in the exercise of self-defence also regulate the 
choice of means and method of warfare and targets available to the state.154 In order to make 
decisions regarding the choice of means there must be a consideration of the anticipated 
damage to civilian life, infrastructure, environmental impact etc. This is a part of 
proportionality that sit very comfortably under jus ad bello. The requirement of 
proportionality in the jus ad bellum sense but as stated earlier, the Advisory Opinion implied 
that both are an in important when determining the proportionality equation and under the 
doctrine of self-defence it is sometimes necessary to use disproportionate force to achieve the 
 
147 United Nations Security Council, 38th Sess., 2491th mtg UN Doc S/PV.2491 (1983, Oct 27). 
148 Louis Henkin ‘The invasion of Panama under international law: a gross violation’ (1991) 29 Colum. J. 
Transnat'l L.at 306. 
149 United Nations Security Council, 26th Sess., 1606th mtg, UN Doc S/PV. 1606 (1971, Dec 04). 
150 United Nations Security Council, 66th Sess., 6718th mtg, UN Doc SC/10550 (2012, Feb 22). 
151 Green op cit note 131 at 119. 
152 R. Ago ‘Addendum – Eighth report on state responsibility (1980) 2 Yearbook of the International Law 
Commission at 69. 
153 William V O’Brien ‘McDougal and Feliciano: Law and minimum world public order: or the legal regulations 
of international coercion’ (1962) 72 Yale Law Journal at 69. 
154 Gardam op cit note 120 at 1838. 
32 
 
necessary ends.  
In the context of weapons there is a distinction between whether a particular weapon 
is inherently disproportionate and the manner in which it is used.155 This issue in 
proportionality is raised when considering non-conventional weapons, whether some 
weapons by nature can never be considered a proportionate use of force.  
In spite of that, it is more so how and when non-conventional weapons are used and in what 
quantity and against what targets that will invoke an assessment of proportionality in terms of 
nuclear weapons.156  
There are many situations where third states are affected by the use of force by other 
states. Especially concerning the use of WMD such as nuclear weapons. Conventional 
weapons too have violated a third states sovereignty. This is important when considering the 
means and scale of the force as it can affect non-participating states. For example, in the 
Corfu Channel Case. This case has had a lasting influence on the law of the sea in regard to 
the concept of innocent passage. Neutral shipping may be damaged or interfered with by 
naval hostilities or blockades157, and on many occasions the right of third states are interfered 
with by the establishment of various types of maritime zones. There is no significant doctrine 
under the UN Charter or legal study or ICJ judgement that resolves the relationship between 
the exercise of self-defence and the rights of third party states. Prior to the UN charter, third 
party states were protected by the law of neutrality however this concept has not been 
elaborated on and exist rather obscurely. Proportionality required that forceful actions in self-
defence must be confined to the area of the attack that they are designed to repel.158 State 
practice is ferly consistent with this requirement especially in regard to the sea.159 A state’s 
territorial waters are an extension of the state and force used at sea would still have to follow 
the proportionate requirement. 
 
b. THE MEASURES TAKEN ARE PROPORTIONAL TO THE ULTIMATE 
GOAL OF ABATING THE ATTACK SUFFERED. 
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In extreme circumstances, it can be accepted that legitimate self-defence is not only 
restricted to halting or repelling an armed attack or that it must be directly proportional to the 
action taken but could require the total defeat of the armed forces including the use of force 
on the aggressing states territory to prevent any further attack and restore security and peace. 
This condition of proportionality indicates that the force used to repel or halt the attack and 
does not require symmetry between the attack and the response. In essence, it is difficult to 
determine precisely, at the beginning of the conflict, what amount of force in self-defence 
will be necessary to defeat an enemy. But in terms of self-defence, proportionality is not only 
whether the means are proportionating to an armed attack but that it is proportionate to 
achieving the legitimate ends of using that force. Therefore, ‘this condition of proportionality, 
which is more subjective than the first, requires that a state using force in self-defence would 
not inflict unnecessary harm, while trying to achieve its aim, i.e. to repulse the attack’160.  
The Advisory opinion reflects the condition that the proportionate response to an 
attack is to be measured in regards to what is necessary to remove the overall threat.161 
Therefore, “The proportionality principal does not in itself exclude the use of nuclear 
weapons in self-defence in all circumstances.”162 This is also reaffirmed in the Nicaragua 
case, that the principal of proportionality must be applied to the forced used defending the 
states security and not the force used by the aggressor state.  
Under this condition, the use of force does not have to be symmetrical, only that force 
used must be proportionate to the legitimate end. Such as in the Korea conflict in 1950, the 
actions of the USA forces in pursuing the North Korean forces above the dividing 38th 
parallel was regarded as permissible despite being disproportionate in terms of scale, because 
it was required to ensure the security of South Korea.163 
Therefore, there is not always proportionate conduct between the aggressor and the 
state using force in self-defence in other words an equivalence of scale approach may not 
always be appropriate.164 Lawful reprisals are limited to actions that are proportionate to their 
antecedent provocation.165 ‘In other words, the harm caused by a retaliatory attack must be in 
proportion to the original attack. The purpose of permitting retaliatory actions is to deter the 
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aggressor from future transgressions by informing the aggressor that any attack will be met 
by an equally destructive response.’166 But this is not the case, the use of force does not have 
to mirror the original attack, the use of force must only be proportionally to achieve the 
desired end result.   
The Security Councils implicit acceptance of British action against Argentina over the 
Falklands islands affirmed the position that action taken must be proportionate to the desired 
goal167. The United Kingdom only used what was considered proportionate force to abate the 
attack from Argentina. Also, in the case of the 1990-91 Persian Gulf conflict an invasion and 
occupation of Iraq by a coalition of allies168 to restore security to the region, and the 
replacement of its system of government, could not have been covered by the law of self-
defence on the argument that that was the only way to deal effectively with the threat posed 
to neighbouring states.169  The use of force corresponded with the specific circumstances and 
thus was passably proportionate to the threat faced.  
The force used to resist an attack is not always proportionate to the actual attack, as 
there is no certainty the same force would halt or end the hostilities. Especially in 
circumstances where there are a series of attacks that differ in weapons and size, what would 
the appropriate response be to many isolated armed attacks. Argo write: ‘if a state suffers a 
series of successive and different acts of armed attack from another state, the requirement of 
proportionality will certainly not mean that the victim state is not free to undertake a single 
armed action on a much larger scale in order to put an end to this escalating succession of 
attacks.170 
 
CHAPTER4: HYPOTHETICAL SCENARIOS   
 
I. A NUCLEAR RESPONSE  
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In the perspective of nuclear weapons, the three previously discussed principals of 
imminence, necessary and proportionality must still be satisfied. It seems very unlikely that 
some as cataclysmic as nuclear weapons could ever be deemed necessary and proportionate 
under the doctrine of self-defence.  
Imminence principal must be absolutely met to justify the use of nuclear weapons in a 
pre-emptive manner. The reason for this is due to the nature of nuclear weapons, one of the 
inherent reasons of possessing nuclear weapons is existential deterrence.171 A threatened 
nuclear response would only be responded to if an attack was imminent due to the nature of 
nuclear weapons, necessity would have to operate as a last resort and for a threat to be 
proportionate, it must pose an effective deterrent—to stop or repel a future attack).172 Either 
the threat must be materializing or on its way. In this sense, the time constrains on using 
nuclear weapons are very tight, realistically once a nuclear weapon has been launched into 
trajectory any response would be imminent and necessary. In terms of the necessity element, 
if a State waits until it has actually suffered a nuclear ‘armed attack’, chances are, it will no 
longer be in a position to defend itself. The most common standard of necessity balances the 
harm caused by the weapon against the necessity of the military goals sought to be 
achieved.'173The atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki by the United States are a 
perfect illustration of this problem. The United States endeavored to exempt its conduct from 
international condemnation by invoking the principle of military necessity. The greatest 
difficulty lies instead with satisfying the proportionality element. The use of a nuclear 
response must not be excessive in abating or repelling the attack—a State may be able to 
defend itself and repel a future attack without necessarily ‘wiping the other State off the 
map’. That harm must not be disproportionate to the expected benefits of achieving those 
ends. Also, because nuclear weapons have the unique potential to inflict irreparable levels of 
damage on the territory and population of the target state, but also are environmentally 
catastrophic in terms of states at large.174 Thus, the proportionality of their effects on third 
states must be considered.175 Nuclear weapons just like conventional weapons must meet the 
requirements for legitimate self-defence. The use of nuclear weapons certainly alters the 
game of war but not necessarily the rules.  
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The use of a nuclear response must not be excessive in abating or repelling the attack—a 
State may be able to defend itself and repel a future attack without necessarily ‘wiping the 
other State off the map’176. The next section will examine at what point a state can lawfully 
respond with the option of a nuclear weapon by using three practical yet hypothetical 
scenarios. North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs are rapidly colliding with Trump’s 
recklessness making the possibility of war in the Korean peninsular the single greatest threat 
to world peace in 2019. Even though North Korea have made steps to rejoining the 
international community, notably reopening communications with South Korea and the 
groundbreaking meeting between Kim Jong Un and Donald Trump. There has been no 
radical changes or disarmament made by either side. As long as this lack of confidence 
persists, the United States and North Korea will just be going around in a vicious circle. By 
using real life relations and the deteriorating situation between the two states as a backdrop to 
three hypothetical situations, we can answer the question posed by this paper.  
 
1. A CONVENTIONAL ATTACK  
 
For years South Korea have dismissed and sometimes were forcefully prevented from 
retaliating against many of North Koreas provocations177. In 2010, a North Korea 
submarine’s torpedo sank a South Korean navy vessel causing the deaths of 46 sailors, and 
later that year, North Korea fired dozens of artillery shells at one of its boarder islands killing 
two marines. South Korea has showed restraint at the continuous “acts of aggression” from 
North Korea that have threated peace in the region. However, due to rising tensions between 
the USA and North Korea, and the twitter berates between the presidents of the two states 
and defiant North Korean nuclear program, nuclear catastrophe has never seemed more 
imminent. The use of nuclear weapons as a self-defence option sits within a legal and 
political grey area. And North Korea have openly stated that they would use Nuclear 
weapons in self-defence.178 In The purpose of this particular hypothetical scenario is to 
determine whether the nuclear option is lawfully permitted in respons to a conventional 
attack.  
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Beginning of 2019, a South Korean airliner strayed into North Korean airspace, North 
Korea on high alert fires missiles brining the plane down killing the 250 passengers on board. 
Trump then tweets “THIS IS THE END LITTLE ROCKET MAN”179, and orders troops in 
Guam and Japan to mobilize and prepare for an attack. Together, the USA’s response gave 
South Korea the confidence to carry out a retaliation. At this stage, the escalation of violence 
to follow could not be controlled by allies or negotiations. South Korea responds with ten 
MOABs (GBU-43/B Massive Ordnance Air burst bomb)180 at North Koreas various air bases 
and nuclear facilities as well as targeted killings of specific military leaders. This crippled 
North Koreas land-based conventional capabilities forcing them to resort to using nuclear 
weapons as a way to abate any further attacks. North Korea used their ‘low yield’ nuclear 
weapons against South Korea and surrounding allied forces. By doing this the conflict was 
halted and all sides entered into negotiations, as both North and South Korea had been almost 
obliterated due to war, the North Korean leadership was in shambles and required 
international support.  
The current test for determining the lawfulness of the use of nuclear weapons in self-
defence was articulated by the ICJ in the Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion181 and in 
Article 51 of the UN Charter which outlines use of force for self-defence. This will help us 
answer our hypothetical question. Is the use of nuclear weapons in self-defence against a 
conventional attack lawful? One must also look at the traditional issues of proportionality and 
necessity from the Caroline case and International customary law to determine the 
lawfulness.  
 
ANALYSES 
 
Two of the requirements needed to meet the threshold of imminence, is that the nature 
and gravity of the attack and if any delay in response could have catastrophic consequences 
(temporal proxy). Nuclear Weapons used in Self-Defence by a State must be due to an 
extreme circumstance, in which its very survival would be at stake. The nature and gravity of 
the attack in this hypothetical scenario could equate to threatening state survival.182 The 
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180 ‘GBU-43/B "Mother Of All Bombs" / MOAB – Massive Ordnance Air Blast Bomb’ GlobalSecurity.org, 
available at https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/munitions/moab.htm Often referred to as the 
‘MOTHER OF ALL BOMBS’ the most powerful non-nuclear weapon in Americans arsenal. 
181 Advisory Opinion supra note 4. 
182 Advisory Opinion supra note 4 para 96. And Georg Schwarzenberger The fundamental principles of 
international law (1955). 
38 
 
crippling on North Koreas conventional capabilities and the targeted killing of important 
military leaders would certainly justify an imminent attack in self-defence. Especially since 
any delay would only damage the state more. Even though nothing as severe as state survival 
has been expected by the ICJ to invoke self-defence, in this case the survival is at state 
therefore certainly meets the immanency requirement.  
North Korea knew that once the South Korean Allies specifically the USA were able 
to mobilize their weapons, particular their nuclear weapons, it could mean the absolute end of 
the North Korean state and leadership (or what was left of it). Therefore, the time to respond 
to South Koreas very tactical and successful conventional front was to use nuclear weapons. 
The imminent threat of the looming allies was just one of their justifications for using nuclear 
weapons. The temporal element of self-defence is satisfied. However, State response to an 
imminent threat cannot be justified if there were any practical alternatives to removing the 
threat.183 
For the necessity clause to be met, a state must justify that the use of force was their 
‘last resort’, either by showing that all possible procedures have been exhausted, the action 
must be by way of a last resort after all peaceful means have failed184, or there should be ‘no 
choice of means’185 which means that the state had no plausible or reasonable choice other 
than force to resolve the situation.  But in our scenario, no peaceful negotiations were even 
attempted. We would have to look back into previously diplomatic missions with North 
Korea. The international community have tried to broker peace between the two states but 
North Korea has yet to respond in good faith, in previous meeting with South Korean leader 
were solely Olympics related and even though the world celebrated the meeting between Kim 
Jong Un and Trump, nothing definitive came from the meeting. It can also be said that no 
attempt to negotiate was taken by either side, USA acted knowing they would be supported 
by allies in the region. However, it can also be argued that in accordance with the ICJ and 
state practice, negotiations or any attempt at peaceful solution are not required for lawful self-
defence in the face of an imminent threat and such attempts are not usually taken.  
Clearly, without any conventional capabilities aside from nuclear weapons then a 
nuclear response could be considered necessary. As there we no ‘choice of means’ available 
other than nuclear weapons. That is to say that the use of nuclear weapons is permissible 
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when conventional weapons are ineffective, then if a State has no other military capabilities 
in the first place (other than the nuclear option), the use of a nuclear weapon would indeed be 
lawful.186 
Repelling or abating a further attack is the entire point of self-defence to prevent 
further destruction and suffering. The necessity elements are seemingly satisfied: this is a last 
resort option and there are no alternatives. However, necessity and proportionality are by 
nature connected and both requirements must be met for the use of force in self-defence to be 
satisfied. It begs the question then that even if the principal of military necessity is satisfied, 
can the incinerating of urban populations and defiling of not only South Koreas territory but 
their own and surrounding states does not seem to meet the proportionality threshold. It 
would certainly repel/abate any future attack but on the other hand, wiping that State off the 
face of the map might be deemed ‘excessive’.187 The question then becomes does the 
defensive necessity negate the slightly ‘disproportionate’ element?  
It is difficult to conceive of a nuclear reprisal that would be proportionate to a 
conventional attack. The vast capacity for destruction possessed by nuclear weapons far 
exceeds the damage that can be caused by conventional means, and it is therefore unlikely 
that this defense would be accepted by the international community. 
188 This is not to say that 
a state must match its mode and level of response to that of the aggressor’s attack, indeed, 
with this in mind the use of nuclear weapons may, in specific circumstances, constitute a 
proportionate response to an attack with conventional weapons.189 However, in response to 
the ten MOABs (GBU-43/B Massive Ordnance Air Burst—one of the most powerful 
‘conventional’ ordnances) would then North Korea be lawfully entitled to respond with a 
‘low yield’ compact/ strategic nuclear option which, has exactly the same destructive 
capacity?190  It has been argued that the strategic or low yield tactical version of nuclear 
weapons do not differ so much from conventional weapons in their intensity and scale of 
their physical effects. But if you analyses the effects of each, the conclusion is that 
conventional weapons still do not reach the level of destruction that nuclear weapons can. 
‘The chief characteristic of conventional weapons is their potential for "blast" or "shock" 
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damage, accompanied by some thermal or heat effects.’191 ‘By contrast, although with 
variations depending on their yield and place of detonation, nuclear weapons produce ‘blast’ 
or "shock" damage and, in addition, ex- tended "thermal radiation", "electromagnetic pulse" 
effects, followed by "residual nuclear radiation" in the form of delayed radioactive fallout 
across potentially great distances and over extended periods of time.’192 The radiation effects, 
it should be noted, which consist of the transmission of gamma rays (neutrons, beta particles, 
and some alpha particles), are not unlike the effects produced by chemical and biological 
weapons as opposed to conventional high-explosive weapons.193 Nuclear weapons, even 
those with fairly low yields would still have harmful effects on combatants, the environment 
and third-party states. North Korea knew that using a nuclear weapon on South Kores would 
evidently affect the Korean peninsula including their own state. Here, the very meaning of 
proportionality becomes lost, and we come dangerously close to condoning the crime of 
genocide, that is, a military campaign directed more towards the extinction of the enemy than 
towards the winning of a battle or conflict,194 and inflicting the same on one’s own 
population.   
Although it can also be argued that nuclear weapons extreme as they may be, do not 
obliterate an entire state and the effects can be localized to some degree. If this was not true 
then japan would no longer exists today and people would not be living in Belarus. The 
dropping of the two atomic bombs over Hiroshima and Nagasaki in World War Two were 
undoubtedly massively destructive and inhumane but Japan was not obliterated from 
existence195. This of course is a debate treading on thin ice and a highly criticized. As both 
Japan and Chernobyl in north-western Ukraine and neighbouring Belarus are still suffering 
the consequences of nuclear fallout.  
The proportionality principle mandates that the force used, even in a defensive posture, 
must be proportional to the quantum of force used by the aggressor.196 Because of the 
disparity between any nuclear weapons and any conventional means of warfare, it is difficult 
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to conceive of a proportionate nuclear defence to a conventional attack.197Although it can be 
argued that the force used was proportionate to arrive at a stage where both states and allies 
halted their force and began pursuing a peaceful end.  
 
2. SELF-DEFENSE AGAINST A NUCLEAR ATTACK  
 
North Korea remains a threat to the world due to their constant disobedience and 
irrational decision making regarding their nuclear weapons. Especially with tensions running 
high between the USA and North Korea at the end of 2018. Twitter war and constant 
boasting of power and prestige between the two states has brought the world to the precipice 
of nuclear war. Also, the continuous trade between North Korea and belligerent states have 
caused for harsher sanctions.  
After disregarding the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), North Korea continued 
to test their nuclear weapons in 2016, causing international outrage. The utter disregard for 
international law in an already complicated situation only increased anxiety in the region.198 
Again in 2017 missile tests by the North Korea highlighted concerns over the state’s nuclear 
program and increased anxiety in the region199. Then after the North Korea’s most powerful 
nuclear test in 2017, the world grew uneasy, as a successfully tested miniaturised hydrogen 
bomb that could be loaded onto an intercontinental missile, as North Korea’s nuclear 
program went from hypothetical to real threat not only to the region but to the world.  
At the end of 2018, North Korea announced that their nuclear weapons program had 
evolved into a nuclear triad200 and had the capability to destroy a state’s nuclear forces in a 
first strike attack. This increased the militarization of the South Korea Boarder, Guam and 
Japan looked towards the USA for support, and the USA delivered more troops and artillery. 
The international community under the auspicious of Treaty of Non-proliferation of Nuclear 
weapons201 united in increased sanctions, halting of aid and minimizing communication.  
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Then in 2019, the USA began moving their military forces into the region for the annual 
‘Foal Eagle’ 202 military exercise with South Korea. It was the first joint exercise as it was 
cancelled in 2018 due to the Winter Olympics in PyeongChang. This exercise was extremely 
important as a tactic to scare North Korean forces. The USS Ronald Reagan warship war the 
head of the incredibly large fleet. North Korea had threatened the exercise via twitter Kim 
Jong Un stated “IF THIS EXERCISE TAKES PLACE WE WILL RESPOND WITH 
FORCE”, underestimating the threat, the states involved carried on as they would not be 
entering North Korean waters therefore any action would be irrational especially with the size 
of the joint military. Alas, North Korea felt extremely threatened and with their nuclear tirade 
capabilities, the international community misread the threat. As the first of the USA fleet 
arrived, Kim Jon Un fired fission devices with smaller nuclear yields, meant to prevent 
further intrusion, however they destroyed the USS Ronald Reagan killing the crew of 5000 
sailors203, they also hit some small vessels which carried military crew and diplomatic 
politicians. The blast from the nuclear weapon knocked out communications and destroyed 
the USS Wasp, an 843-foot-long amphibious assault ship204 which was carrying 1,687 Troops 
and a variety of military cargo. Since there were no lines of communication, an error in 
judgement set off a cascading series of responses that ultimately lead to all-out war. 
On the realization that North Korea were fully prepared to use nuclear weapons to ensure 
their security and state survival, the USA responded with full nuclear capacity.  Before North 
Korea could target USA bases in South Korea, Guam and Japan or the USA mainland, the 
USA under the leadership of trump, responded with ‘FIRE AND FURY’ targeting the air 
defense battery and military bases in North Korea, this time, North Korea would be punished 
for their insolence. The USA targeted Hwajin-ri Missile Base205 and Junghwa-gun Missile 
Base206 which are both located in the Pyongyang province killing countless civilians, 
destroying the infrastructure and crippling the country. In order to prevent North Koreas 
second strike nuclear capacity, the USA targeted other suspected launch bases to avoid 
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further nuclear retaliation.  The USA used their nuclear tipped missiles (B61-12 gravity 
bombs) that were on their submarines207 these have incredibly accurate capabilities.  
 
ANALYSES  
 
A nuclear response to an actual nuclear attack, presents the strongest case for 
permitting a nuclear strike in some capacity. The imminence criteria are reasonably met due 
to the nuclear attack, with both states having second strike capabilities, there is no time to 
deliberate or negotiate and a nuclear strike can certainly be interpreted as ‘overwhelming’. 
The nature of nuclear weapons as discussed in chapter 3 require an imminent response 
whether to an attack or threat.   
Necessity relates to the existence of an ongoing armed attack or the existence of a 
credible threat of an impending armed attack, as well as to the existence of feasible 
alternatives to the taking of armed action in self-defence.208 It has been established that when 
considering a nuclear attack that the requirement of imminence is satisfied. North Korea has 
already threatened to use nuclear weapons in self-defence, therefore the USA knew that it 
was a possibility that North Korea would use intercontinental missiles to target mainland 
USA, Japan or Guam if their response wasn’t effective enough to repel or halt that threat. The 
use of nuclear weapon was necessary to achieve the military goals of pausing the conflict and 
attempting to find a peaceful resolution.  
In extreme cases, such as nuclear weapons it has been argued that the total defeat of 
the armed forces of the aggressor state would be necessary to achieve this end.209 However, 
in this hypothetical scenario, the USA and allies did not just defeat the armed forces for 
North Korea, they obliterated the state. The death toll would amount to over 2 million 
people210 with catastrophic damage to the infrastructure and irreparable damage to the 
environment. Although, it is the right of a State to use the necessary counter-force to achieve 
that end. No more than is necessary and no less than is required under the circumstances. 
This is what defines it and distinguishes it from other forms of the use of force, both those 
which are legal and those which are not. But even if the response was reasonable, and 
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satisfied the necessity threshold and even if such a threat would not commensurate211,  it still 
needs to satisfy the proportionality criteria for the response to be legitimate.  
Proportionality in connection with the exercise of self-defence relates both to the 
overall scale and effect of the attack, as well as what is required under the circumstances to 
repel the attack and put an end to the threat of further attacks.212 If you judge proportionality 
on a scale and effects. The force used and by the USA was disproportionate. In the case of 
large scale attacks aimed at totally or significantly disrupting the target State, or taking over 
its territory, proportionality would allow for the waging of a full-scale war in self-defence 
aimed at reducing or eliminating the attacking party’s capacity to conduct military operations, 
or otherwise continue with its attack. However, proportionality is considered to be limited in 
intensity and magnitude to what is reasonably necessary to promptly secure permissible 
objectives of self-defence.213 In this sense the USA used what force was ‘reasonably’ 
proportionate to end the conflict as well as to protect themselves and allies from a second 
nuclear strike from North Korea. The USA’s response was proportionate to achieve the 
legitimate goal, the repulsion of the attack.214 
Although it is still difficult to ascertain if the degree of the response was appropriate, the 
doctrine of self-defence exists in order to prevent further damage to a state’s territory, its 
civilians, and those of their allies. North Korea had used nuclear weapons on ships in 
international waters, however the USA targeted mainland North Korea, the loss of civilian 
lives and infrastructure is significantly more than ships carrying military personal and 
diplomatic leaders.  The human toll is disproportionate. But in order for the USA to defend 
themselves against an additional nuclear strike, they needed to target North Koreas available 
nuclear weapons. A full-scale assault of North Koreas nuclear forces would doubtlessly result 
in incalculable destruction and would therefore be disproportionate. Nevertheless, a more 
limited or conventional responsewould not achieve the same objectives and prevent further 
harm from being inflicted. ‘Therein lies the flaw with nuclear responses in self-defense to a 
nuclear attack: the degree of force needed to effectively defend against future attacks is 
inherently disproportionate to the destruction that it would necessarily cause, particularly 
given the fact that there is no guarantee that the aggressor would launch additional 
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weapons.’215’In the Advisory opinion, the court did not confirm that the use of nuclear 
weapons is proportional to only an attack involving the use of nuclear weapons, it was only 
implied that they would need to employ an ‘equivalence to scale’ based approach.’216  
 
3. PRE-EMPTIVE SELF-DEFENSE 
 
The USA especially under its current Trump have been avid supporters of pre-emptive 
self-defence217 and have shown little interest in preserving international law and has at times 
been very hostile towards the UN. The escalating tensions between North Korea and the USA 
have brought the Korean peninsula close to the brink of war. However, under the trump 
administration, Washington is just as likely to initiate the first strike as Pyongyang is. And 
both states would certainly use nuclear weapons to do so. Such a strike may be the only way 
to decisively end the North Korean nuclear program, but its incalculable effects would extend 
far beyond the devastation and destruction in Korea. The North Korean nuclear program has 
achieved capabilities that threaten the world, the recent test of their hydrogen bomb along 
with its intercontinental ballistic missile capabilities, which means they could reach mainland 
USA, have caused tremendous fear in the region and world especially under an unpredictable 
and dangerous North Korean leadership.  These very real threats have been aggravated by the 
provocative and antagonistic reactions by Trump.  
He has escalated the bellicosity to unprecedented levels, publicly threatening to respond 
to North Korean threats with “fire and fury like the world has never seen,” and promising to 
“totally destroy North Korea” if forced to defend the United States or its allies. After Trump, 
personally denigrated Kim Jong Un as “rocket man” during a U.N. speech, Kim warned that 
he would “tame the mentally deranged US dotard with fire.” Shortly thereafter, the United 
States flew bombers further north along the North Korean coastline than at any time since 
2000. North Korea’s foreign minister responded by saying the United States had “declared 
war” on his country and specifically threatened to shoot down U.S. bombers even if they 
were outside North Korean airspace. North Korea have also in the past stated that they have 
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no problem with using their nuclear weapons in self-defence218. Therefore, North Korea do 
not only have the capability to carry out a nuclear threat but are fully prepared to use them.  
Say that 2019 starts off with Pyongyany deifying the international community and testing 
a hydrogen bomb over the Pacific Ocean, confirming the USA’s worst fear, North Korea had 
now developed an Intercontinental ballistic missile that a nuclear warhead can be attached to.  
The USA has always reserved the right to use its nuclear weapons first against such a 
compelling threat as states in The Strategy. Convinced that a conventional attack would be 
ineffective as it would take too long and the USA military cannot guarantee that they would 
be able to destroy North Koreas second strike capability or destroy and locate every single 
North Korean warhead. A conventional strike would leave open the possibility of nuclear 
retaliation against the USA allies and possibly even the USA homeland, an outcome Trump 
would not accept. 
Thus, the USA initiated a surprise nuclear first strike attack which carries much less USA 
military risks and speculation. The USA was able to deploy ships, airplanes and nuclear 
munitions into already established bases with little attention. By using a significant number 
of lower-yielding nuclear weapons they were able to eliminate any suspected North Korean 
launch pad, storage site and other facilities, as well as chemical stockpiles to remove the 
possibility of a retaliatory second strike. A first strike nuclear attack although annihilated the 
North Korea nuclear threat had inconceivable economic, political and moral costs.  
 
ANALYSES  
 
Assuming the legitimacy of a pre-emptive self-defence as discussed in detail in 
Chapter 2 (ai2). The application of the proportionality equation will first require identifying 
the aim of the use of force.219 The principal of proportionality must be limited to countering 
the threatened attack and the scale and mode of the response will be determined by the nature 
and gravity of the anticipated armed attack. 220 It is within this condition of proportionality 
that the goal of securing against future attacks may be acceptable.  
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Does the threat of nuclear war satisfy the imminence requirement? It is difficult to 
assert whether North Koreas actions constitute as an imminent threat, as many time North 
Korea has defied the UN and tested their weapons and often made aggressive actions towards 
USA and allies but never have they attempted a full scaled attack. Although, the attempt to 
acquire and possess nuclear weapons is troubling, especially considering their devastating 
character, the International Court of Justice has recognized that these activities are not per se 
illegal.221Alas, imminence under pre-emptive self-defence is not primarily a question of time, 
but one of the existence of a credible threat of probable or in exceptional cases potential 
attack, which together with necessity, the absence of feasible alternatives, make the taking of 
pre-emptive action.222 There is a consensus among states that the use of force in response to 
an imminent threat cannot be justified if there were alternative to removing the threat223.  The 
USA in this scenario would have to prove that all peaceful means had been attempted and 
that the threat was real.224 Thus, all peaceful means of ending or averting the attack were 
unavailable.225 In this scenario, we can acknowledge the previous attempts at negotiations by 
the international community, including the UN and USA President Donald Trump.  
The sanctions imposed on North Korea by the international community have had very 
little effect, North Korea has continued to develop its nuclear and missile programs.226 North 
Korea continues to forgo the arms embargo and trade embargos finding unique way to trade 
with Syria and other individuals and companies. However, this assertion by the USA is 
problematic, North Korea cannot represent an imminent threat for trading nuclear technology 
with delinquent states or terrorists because the ICJ in the Nicaragua case did not consider 
that the concept of armed attack stretched as far as assistance to rebels in the form of the 
provision of weapons or logistic or other support.227   
North Korea continues to defy the sanctions. The idea is that the sanctions would 
force North Korea to seek a peaceful resolution.  Sanctions constitute a means of exerting 
international influence that is more powerful than diplomatic mediation but lies below the 
threshold of military intervention. Can sanctions be regarded as fulfilling the requirement of 
seeking peaceful alternative to force? This is essential security council action, ineffective and 
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it is difficult to believe that states would agrees to give up their right to self-defence to an 
international body, particularly the Security Council no matter what Article 51 denotes. 
Therefore, we can assume that all peacefully alternative were made to no avail, North Korea 
a rouge state would not bend its will even if its people starved to death.  Although, 
negotiations are still an option, in fact Trump has stated that he is willing to negotiate with 
Kim Jong Un in an effort to curtail North Koreas nuclear program, the North wants a 
guarantee of security from the US, and a policy of pressure will only make North Korea feel 
even more insecure. Also, the deal that the USA has given to North Korea is complete 
disarmament and doesn’t give many options for North Korea. It’s a bad deal and without the 
USA making moves to reduce their military presence and lessen their aggression then there 
will be no change in the region.  
As discussed in chapter 2, pre-emptive self-defence should be limited to nuclear 
threats as the threat of nuclear weapons change the calculus of self-defence because waiting 
until a nuclear attack is materializing requires waiting until it is too late. A nuclear threat by 
nature must be regarded as imminent. State practice also supports this with the Iraq and Syria. 
Rouge states that have access to nuclear technology or are in the initial stages of developing a 
nuclear reactor have been destroyed as they pose imminent threats to international peace and 
security. The threat of WMD in the hands of states with a track record of unpredictable 
behaviour has caused states to shift their views of the propriety of pre-emptive self-defence 
against such a threat.228 
Therefore, the use of force in self-defence will be legitimate as there was an 
immediate and real threat posed by North Korea. However, according to the ICJ the attempt 
to acquire and possess nuclear weapons is troubling, especially considering their irrational 
leadership and thuggish behaviours but are not illegal per se.  Such as in the Osirak case, 
even though there was no clear evidence that North Korea was materializing an attack, the 
relations between the two states and various remarks made by each side suggested than an 
attack was eminent however, there is no conclusive evidence that North Korea were about to 
attack the USA mainland. Although, North Korea have illegally developed nuclear weapons, 
and sold them to rouge states while also bating and threatening the USA and allies. Thus, 
instead of forcing the USA to wait until the attack was underway, or about to commence, the 
pre-emptive use of force deems a lawful a response that takes place in the last window of 
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opportunity in which a state may act effectively to defend itself against an entity that has both 
the intent and capacity to attack.229 This along with state practice would imply that the USA 
is legally allowed to use force as it had concrete evidence that North Korea intended to use 
nuclear weapons against the USA and allies.  
It can also be confirmed that state practice has changed post 11 September 2001, after 
the USA suffered such a devastating attack, they took the role of pre-emptive self-defence 
more seriously. The threat itself became enough to evoke self-defence regarding rouge states, 
more so terrorism but WMD have also been included as they pose the greatest threat to the 
world peace and security. In this scenario, the threat posed by North Korea would be argued 
greater than the Iraqi threat in 2001, the effects of a nuclear weapons would devastate the 
USA and the Korean Peninsula. It was necessary to prevent a possibility of catastrophe and 
rather limit it to just one state.  Necessity is an integral aspect of pre-emptive use of force, the 
need to establish the necessity threshold is more onerous in the case of pre-emptive action. 
Were the actions of the USA reasonable? According to the USA the use of nuclear weapons 
was necessary to destroy north Koreas second strike capabilities. However, any use of force 
in North Korea will not meet the requirement of necessity because any war on the peninsula 
would be costly in human lives and economic terms. ‘Any war would bring many casualties 
and the costs of reconstruction would be huge, because according with a report of the analyst 
Gary Luck, the costs would surpass the 100 billion dollars and the destruction and 
interruption of trade would cost a trillion dollars to the countries involved and their 
neighbors.’230  
There was an absence of practical alternatives as a conventional front in its 
geographical and destructive scope and its duration would not guarantee that all North Koreas 
nuclear launch sites and stockpiles would be confiscated or destroyed. The USA and allies 
would find it extremely difficult to penetrate North Korea not only because of the 
Demilitarized zone but also because of the terrain. Most of the warehouses are located in 
mountains surrounded by rivers therefore a major attack would difficult and there would be 
no element of surprise. There needs to be certainty when considering nuclear weapons. But 
how can we be certain of the evidence, since any unilateral determination that it is the 
imminent target of a nuclear attack may be based on unreliable or inaccurate information. 
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It is conceivable that a nuclear first strike might be in response to a perceived but yet 
expected threat of nuclear attack. Even though, the imminent nature of the attack would 
negate the rules of use of force, it can be argued that it would not meet the test of 
proportionality. In just ad bellum, proportionality has a dual role, it serves to identify the 
situations in which the unilateral use of force is permissible, and it serves to determine the 
intensity and the magnitude of military action.231  
In both the Nicaragua and Nuclear Advisory case proportionality was applied 
regarding the aim of abating the attack being responded to, rather than in regard to an 
equivalence of scale or intensity. 232 However, a war on the Korean Peninsula would take 
place in densely populated areas. It is likely that hundreds of thousands of persons US, ROK 
and DPRK, military and civilian would perish and millions of refugees would be created. The 
expense of a regime change would be enormous. A pre-emptive strike of the sort 
contemplated here, particularly if surface bursts are involved, still would inflict large-scale 
collateral harms beyond the place and moment of immediate conflict.233  The massive 
potential for destruction from using nuclear weapons renders it even more important for the 
nations involved not to initiate a nuclear response to a nuclear threat. The strategy on the 
USA that broadens their right to first use should be avoided. The collateral damage is too 
much for the action to be proportionate.  
In conclusion, this situation does not satisfy the conditions that warrant a pre-emptive 
strike. Instead available intelligence will probably be questionable, the threats uncertain and 
in no way clearly imminent, and the military option but one of several policies available.234 
Even if the path to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula is not an easy task, it is necessary to 
establish the basis to solve the nuclear puzzle through negotiations and appealing to mutual 
thrust and cooperation. Negotiation is the key to solving this dilemma as no use of nuclear 
weapons, especially in a pre-emptive manner, in self-defence could meet the required 
principals of imminence, necessity and proportionality in the traditional sense.  
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International law may find itself in need of a new doctrine that can adequately address 
the threat of nuclear weapons.  Thankfully these scenarios remain hypothetical as nuclear 
weapons are the most destructive man-made weapon on the planet. International law and 
numerous different treaties are ineffective in disarming and halting the proliferation of 
nuclear weapons. The NPT, IEA and Security council have not effectively made headway 
towards totally nuclear disarmament. It seems to me that we are in need of a new framework 
to particularly law out rules for the use of nuclear weapons or the changed doctrine of self-
defence. Self-defence needs to be readdressed and extended to include modern threats until 
the significant gaps in the legal and institutional framework to combat the contemporary 
threats to peace and security are filled. Of course, it would be naive to expect that the law 
alone can make the progressive difference, particularly when, as here, it touches sensitively 
upon prevailing notions of national security. Therefore, it must be a collective effort to 
disarmament as the ‘complete elimination of nuclear weapons is the only guarantee against 
the threat of nuclear war.’235 
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